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The current research was conducted in order to test the effects of contextual 
information on the social categorization process and to examine the nature of the Black 
stereotype. Two studies sought to accomplish these goals by using a modified flanker 
paradigm in which participants categorized targets as Black or White while context 
information, determined by emotion words (Experiment 1) or stereotype-related words 
(Experiment 2), was simultaneously presented. Additionally, participants in each study 
completed a well-established test of racial bias (weapons task; Payne, 2001) to try to 
ascertain possible connections between the categorization of racial cues amid distracting 
context information and automatic and controlled components of racial bias. Behavioral and 
physiological results indicated that White participants did not process contextual information 
until later stages of processing and attended first to Black targets and then to White targets. 
Finally, although not fully supported, there was some preliminary evidence that a stereotype 









 I would like to thank the members of my dissertation committee for their thoughtful 
insights and contributions to my research. Additionally, thanks are extended to all of the 
faculty at UNC. I hope I can follow in their footsteps of academic excellence and 
inspirational leadership. Finally, thanks especially to my advisor, Bruce Bartholow, for 








 This document is dedicated to my father, who always encouraged me to do my best 
and follow my dreams. His courage and strength have inspired me and have been the keys to 






TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
                     Page 
 
LIST OF TABLES………………………………………………………………………….viii 
 
LIST OF FIGURES………………………………………………………………………......ix 
 




Anti-Black Stereotypes and Social Categorization……………………………1 
 
The Automatic and Controlled Components of Anti-Black Stereotypes…..….2 
 
Implicit Measures of Anti-Black Stereotyping………………………………..5 
 
The Role of Contextual Information in Social Categorization………………..7 
 
The Nature of Anti-Black Stereotypes……………………………………….13 
 
Psychophysiological Measures of Stereotyping……………………………..18 
 
The Current Research………………………………………………………..24 
 




Materials and Experimental Paradigm..………………………….…………..32 
 




III  EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS………………………………………………...37 
 
Flanker Task: RT Data………………………………………….……………37 
 
Flanker Task: ERP Data……………………………………………………...38 
 v
  
Weapons Task: RT Data……………………………………………………..41 
 
Weapons Task: Accuracy Data………………………………………………41 
 
Weapons Task: Automatic and Controlled Components…………………….42 
 
Weapons Task: ERP Data……………………………………………………43 
 
Individual Difference Measures……………………………………………...44 
 
Correlations between Flanker Task ERPs and Weapons Task Performance...45 
 
IV EXPERIMENT 1 DISCUSSION……………………………………………47 
 








VI EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS………………………………………………...54 
 
Flanker Task: RT Data…………………………………………………….....54 
 
Flanker Task: ERP Data……………………………………………………...56 
 
Weapons Task: RT Data……………………………………………………..59 
 
Weapons Task: Accuracy Data………………………………………………59 
 
Weapons Task: Automatic and Controlled Components…………………….60 
 
Weapons Task: ERP Data……………………………………………………60 
 
Correlations between Flanker Task and Weapons Task……………………..61 
 
Individual Difference Measures……………………………………………...62 
 
VII EXPERIMENT 2 DISCUSSION………………………………………….....63 
 











   
 
 vii
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table                    Page 
 
1. Experiment 1 flanker task RT means……..……………………………………...……..…86 
 
2. Experiment 1 weapons task RT means...……………………………………….……....…87 
 
3. Experiment 1 weapons task automatic and controlled estimates….…………...………….88 
 
4. Correlations between flanker task ERPs and weapons task performance………………...89 
 
5. Experiment 2 flanker task RT means..………………………………………………….…90 
 
6. Experiment 2 weapons task RT means...………………………………………………….91 
 
7. Experiment 2 weapons task automatic and controlled estimates...…...………………...…92 
 
8. Experiment 2 correlations between flanker task ERPs and weapons task performance…..93
 viii
 LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure                    Page 
 
1. Experiment 1 Flanker Task: RT as a Function of Emotion and Target Race……………..94 
 
2. Experiment 1 ERP Amplitude as a Function of Target Race. Measurements taken at frontal 
midline electrode Fz…………………………………………………………………….........95 
 
3. Experiment 1 Flanker Task: P300 amplitude as a Function of Emotion and Target Race..96 
 
4. Experiment 1 Weapons Task: RT as a Function of Prime and Target……………….........97 
 
5. Experiment 2 Flanker Task: RT as a Function of Stereotype and Target Race…………...98 
 












Anti-Black Stereotypes and Social Categorization 
 
 The problem of anti-Black prejudice and stereotyping has been of concern to social 
psychologists for decades. The area has captured the attention of basic and applied 
researchers alike, and has important implications for Blacks and other minority group 
members, as well as for the society in which we live. Researchers have come to regard 
stereotyping and prejudice as the result of social categorization (Hogg, 2004; Macrae, Milne, 
& Bodenhausen, 1994), which occurs when we think of a person not as an individual, but as 
a member of a particular social group or groups. Theoretically, social categorization allows 
perceivers to minimize the amount of effort required to negotiate the social world by 
compartmentalizing social information (Bodenhausen, 1990; Fiske & Taylor, 1991). Studies 
have suggested that categorization takes place extremely quickly, often within a few hundred 
milliseconds (e.g., Giner-Sorolla, Garcia, & Bargh, 1999; Ito & Urland, 2003). Thus, social 
categorization can be seen as adaptive -- and perhaps necessary -- for functioning in a 
complex world because it helps us make judgments about and easily respond to those whom 
we encounter (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Macrae et al., 1994).  
Research examining the social categorization process has shown that categorization 
activates schemas, which are mental representations that contain cognitive and affective 
information about a stimulus (Moscovici, 1984). The schemas that are activated along with 
the social category contain both positive and negative information about that category 
 (Brewer, 1988). Schemas also often contain stereotypes, such that activating a social 
category may lead the perceiver to activate and ascribe traits associated with the category to 
the individual being perceived (Darley & Gross, 1983; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). Research 
has shown that stereotypes become automatically activated along with categorization 
(Devine, 1989; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986), and that this stereotype activation can have 
consequences for behavior (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). For example, laboratory studies 
have shown that participants are quicker to identify words consistent with a Black stereotype 
(e.g., violent, lazy) when the ‘Black’ category is activated in memory than when the ‘White’ 
category is activated (e.g., Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). Stereotype activation 
can also have negative consequences for behavior in more applied settings, such as an 
employer interviewing a Black job candidate (Jussim, Palumbo, Smith, & Madon, 2000) or a 
police officer deciding whether or not to shoot a Black suspect (Correll, Park, Wittenbrink, & 
Judd, 2002; Payne, 2001). In such cases, the negative stereotypes that are automatically 
activated upon perception of the target may lead perceivers to take actions based upon the 
incomplete, over-generalized information provided by stereotypes. 
The Automatic and Controlled Components of Anti-Black Stereotypes 
Over the past 60 years, opinion surveys have documented substantial changes in 
racial attitudes among White Americans, suggesting that anti-Black sentiment has been in 
decline (Biernat & Crandall, 1999; Devine & Elliott, 1995; Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1997; 
Wittenbrink, Judd, & Park, 1997). Dovidio and Gaertner (2000), for instance, found that 
participants in 1998-1999 reported lower levels of prejudice than had participants ten years 
earlier. Madon and colleagues (2001) also found that between 1933 and 2000, almost all of 
the stereotypes that White Americans held about Black Americans have changed; that is, the 
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 content of the African American stereotype has changed over time, and overall has become 
less negative. However, the results from these studies involving self-reported levels of 
prejudice are inconsistent with results from experimental studies using more indirect 
measures of racial attitudes, which illustrate that Whites’ automatic evaluations of Blacks are 
still negative (Bargh & Chen, 1997; Devine, 1989; Fazio et al., 1995; Kawakami, Dion, & 
Dovidio, 1998; Maddux, Barden, Brewer, & Petty, 2005; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). Because 
of this inconsistency, researchers have concluded that self-report methods may be susceptible 
to bias. That is, participants may not be willing to report their true attitudes because they may 
be sensitive to societal norms of equality (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2000), or they may hold a 
positive attitude toward a social group (and report them on a racism scale, for example) and 
still be influenced by negative group stereotypes (e.g., Devine, 1989; Plant & Devine, 1998). 
 The conflicting results from studies involving different methods highlight a common 
distinction in the social psychological literature: that between automatic and controlled 
processes. Automatic processing refers to the effortless, spontaneous activation of learned 
information, whereas controlled processing is a result of intentional control and conscious 
thought (e.g., Bargh, 1997; Wittenbrink et al., 1997). This distinction between the automatic 
and controlled components of stereotypes and prejudice has become a popular one within the 
field. In a landmark paper, Devine (1989) provided evidence that Whites, regardless of 
prejudice level, automatically activate stereotypic information about others. She contends 
that these stereotypes exist in memory and are the result of repeated activation of learned 
associations. However, Devine’s research indicates that individual prejudice level is not 
determined by these automatic associations, but instead is determined by more controlled, 
conscious processes. In her study, Devine used a priming procedure in which participants 
 3
 were subliminally primed with social categories (e.g., Blacks) or stereotypes (e.g., lazy). 
They were later asked to read a paragraph describing a race-unspecified target person and his 
ambiguously hostile behaviors (Srull & Wyer’s [1979] “Donald” paragraph), and then rate 
this target person on several trait scales. Devine found that all participants, both high and low 
in self-reported prejudice, produced stereotype-congruent responses on the trait scales, such 
that when primed with words related to the social category and the stereotype of Blacks, 
participants judged the target to be more hostile. Thus, all participants, regardless of 
prejudice level, incorporated these well-learned stereotypes into their characterization of the 
Black target. This research is particularly important in illustrating the automatic activation of 
stereotypes because the participants were unaware that they were seeing any racial 
information. In a more recent refinement of Devine’s (1989) work, Lepore and Brown (1997) 
primed only the social category of Blacks and found that targets were judged as more 
negative only among participants who had high self-reported prejudice. However, both high- 
and low-prejudiced participants increased their negative ratings of a target when valenced 
stereotype content was also primed. Taken together, these studies demonstrate that activating 
the social category of “Blacks” tends to lead people to interpret an ambiguous target as more 
negative and, specifically, more violent (Correll et al., 2002). 
  Thus, automatic stereotype activation may influence our thoughts and behaviors, in 
that when we see a Black target we automatically activate the racial stereotypes ingrained in 
our memories (Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1997; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983). 
Furthermore, although individuals who may have a motivation to be non-prejudiced may try 
to inhibit their racial stereotypes from affecting their behavior, these efforts are often 
unsuccessful (Amodio, Harmon-Jones, Devine, Curtin, Hartley, & Covert, 2004; Devine & 
 4
 Monteith, 1999). To summarize, “several lines of research have shown that group stereotypes 
may be activated outside of awareness and may influence behavior without the knowledge or 
intent of the perceiver” (Payne, 2001, p. 181). 
Implicit Measures of Anti-Black Stereotyping 
Because of the automatic nature of stereotype activation, much recent research has 
moved away from traditional self-report methods (thought to index conscious processing) 
and towards more implicit measures (associated with automatic processing). Priming 
paradigms like those used in the research just described have dominated the field of implicit 
attitude measurement. In these paradigms, participants are presented with a stimulus meant to 
bring category information to mind (the prime), followed quickly by a target that participants 
must act upon (e.g., classifying a letter string as a word or non-word; Higgins, Bargh, & 
Lombardi, 1985). Because priming paradigms involve stimuli being processed extremely 
quickly so that the participant cannot easily control thinking about them, or even so rapidly 
that the participant cannot consciously recognize them, many priming studies are thought to 
measure automatic processing, and thus can be used to identify automatic stereotype 
activation (Bargh, 1997). Priming studies have demonstrated that categorizing a target letter 
string as a word (as opposed to a nonword) is facilitated when the prime is related to that 
word (e.g., is a characteristic of the target’s category; Higgins et al., 1985). These paradigms 
have been extended to person perception studies as well. For example, when primes are 
presented to participants directly before they make judgments about a target, participants are 
more likely to judge the target in terms of the primed concept (e.g., Srull & Wyer, 1979). 
Additionally, priming has been shown to affect behavior.  For example, Kawakami, Young, 
and Dovidio (2002) found that when participants were primed with pictures of elderly faces, 
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 they categorized the photographs more slowly than did participants primed with younger 
faces. In a related study, participants first primed with elderly concepts walked more slowly 
away from the laboratory at the conclusion of the study than did participants who had been 
primed with neutral concepts (Bargh, Chen, & Burrows, 1996). Given the subtle nature of 
these measures and that their association with the primed concepts was not obvious, such 
results are thought to demonstrate the automatic, unconscious influence that primed 
categories have on perceivers’ behavior. 
 The experiment by Wittenbrink et al. (1997) used a priming paradigm as an implicit 
measure and self-reported racial attitudes as an explicit measure to assess the relationship 
between implicit and explicit forms of prejudice. Specifically, participants were subliminally 
primed with either the word “Black” or the word “White.” They then viewed a string of 
letters that they identified as a word or non-word as quickly as possible. There were two 
types of trials of interest to the experimenters. The first were “compatible” trials, in which 
the category label stereotypically “matched” the target word (e.g., “White” with 
“intelligent”). The contrasting “incompatible” trials were those in which the category label 
did not stereotypically match the target word (e.g., “White” with “poor”). The researchers 
found that participants identified letter strings faster on compatible trials (e.g., when 
positively valenced White American traits followed the “White” prime and when negatively 
valenced Black American traits followed the “Black” prime) than on incompatible trials. 
Furthermore, these results were correlated positively with self-reported racist attitudes. Taken 
together, the above studies demonstrate that priming studies can be a good tool to measure 
the automatic activation of racial stereotypes and that the activation of the social category 
“Blacks” automatically leads to the activation of negative concepts associated with the group. 
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 The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is another implicit measure designed to assess 
the automatic activation of stereotypes. The IAT (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) 
uses response latency to indirectly measure the strength of association between concepts. In 
the race IAT, participants classify faces or first names representing racial groups (e.g., Black 
and White) and evaluative attributes (e.g., pleasant and unpleasant words). Responses are 
considered automatic in that participants are ostensibly unable to control their biased 
responses (Dasgupta, McGhee, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2000). Participants taking the race IAT 
generally respond more quickly when pleasant attributes are paired with the same response as 
White faces or names and when unpleasant attributes are paired with the same response as 
Black faces or names (Greenwald et al., 1998). Thus, the IAT is thought to show evidence for 
the automatic preference for Whites such that positive attributes are more strongly associated 
with Whites than Blacks. However, it is important to note that there is not consensus on the 
psychometric properties of the IAT (Blanton & Jaccard, 2006). 
The Role of Contextual Information in Social Categorization 
 Although many studies using implicit measures have demonstrated the automatic 
nature of social categorization, less research has focused on how contextual information may 
affect the social categorization process. Several researchers (e.g., Macrae, Bodenhausen, & 
Milne, 1995; Smith & Zarate, 1992) have suggested that contextual information may affect 
the categorization process. Macrae et al. (1995) found that subliminally priming participants 
with different social categories affected how they categorized a picture of a person. 
Participants in their study had to categorize a Chinese woman, who obviously could be 
categorized by either her ethnicity or her gender. Results indicated that when participants 
were subliminally primed with the social category “woman,” they were quicker to categorize 
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 the target person as having female rather than Chinese traits. In contrast, participants who 
were subliminally primed with “Chinese” were more likely to categorize the target as 
Chinese. According to Macrae et al., the contextual information that was primed before 
categorization led participants to attend to certain category information and inhibit other 
category information. 
 But what would happen if contextual information did not activate the specific social 
category but instead activated a stereotype or trait that was either consistent or inconsistent 
with the social category? For example, if Macrae et al.’s (1995) participants had been 
subliminally primed with a Chinese stereotype versus a female stereotype, would the effects 
remain the same? Like Macrae et al.’s (1995) research, this question has theoretical 
implications for real-world behavior. When we perceive a person as a member of a social 
category, stereotype-related contextual information with which we are presented may affect 
our processing of the target individual and, by extension, our own subsequent behavior. 
 Another issue pertinent to the discussion of context effects concerns when, in the 
course of processing, context information is presented. The study by Macrae et al. (1995) 
used a priming procedure in which the context was established by a prime stimulus that 
temporally preceded the onset of the target. Similar paradigms have been used in recent years 
by researchers interested in the neural activity associated with categorization (to be reviewed 
later), in which a target representing a social category is presented after a context established 
by several preceding stimuli (e.g., a Black face preceded by a number of White faces or vise-
versa). Such paradigms provide information concerning how a prior context influences 
processing of a given target, but less is known about the effects of context information 
presented simultaneously with a target, a situation that more closely resembles people as they 
 8
 are encountered in real life. This issue has important practical as well as theoretical 
implications, some of which are discussed next. 
 As reviewed above, numerous studies have demonstrated that implicit measures of 
categorization show facilitation of responses to stereotype-consistent stimuli and impaired 
responding to stereotype-inconsistent stimuli (e.g., Wittenbrink et al., 1997). The Spreading 
Activation Model, which assumes that RT is facilitated when two concepts are linked closely 
in semantic memory, has traditionally been used to explain such findings. However, more 
recent research suggests an alternative explanation based on the control of attention in 
cognitive processing through models such as the Continuous Flow Model and Response 
Conflict Theory.  
 Response Conflict Theory (RCT) grew out of the Continuous Flow Model, originally 
proposed by Donders (1969). The Continuous Flow Model proposes that as information 
about stimuli accumulates gradually in the visual system, responses are primed or partially 
activated and thus response activation begins as soon as a stimulus is perceived. When 
stimuli are perceived, input channels begin a system of elementary processes that operate 
serially in which output is transferred to feature detectors, which then feed the output to form 
units, which in turn act as a priming device to activate flow to the response system. When the 
flow reaches this final level, a response is made (Eriksen & Schultz, 1977). The Continuous 
Flow Model suggests that as this processing cycle goes on, a wide range of responses are 
initially primed, but the priming flow becomes restricted to fewer responses as more 
information accumulates about the stimulus. Thus, initially, the responses that are all 
activated at the same time are in competition with one another (Coles, Gratton, Bashore, 
Eriksen, & Donchin, 1985). Additionally, the model suggests that there is a certain threshold 
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 that must be crossed in order for an overt response to be made. Before this threshold is 
crossed, responses that are primed are held back by inhibitory processes, but when the overt 
response reaches the threshold, the inhibition is overcome and hence a response is made 
(Eriksen & Schultz, 1977). 
  RCT assumes that there is a pairing between the processor that analyzes the stimuli 
and the response activation process. Thus, RCT suggests that because two or more responses 
can be activated simultaneously, it is often necessary to make a choice between these two 
conflicting responses. For example, when one is faced with an aggressive perpetrator, it is 
often necessary to decide whether to fight or run away. Similarly, as is illustrated in the 
categorization literature, we often make choices while perceiving other people in everyday 
situations. It is often necessary to decide whether a person is trustworthy or dangerous, for 
example, and we often have limited information about that person’s characteristics. RCT 
assumes that we are often making choices between a prepotent, or well-learned response 
(e.g., one has learned over the years to run away at the sight of an aggressive other) and a less 
well-learned response (e.g., choosing to fight an aggressive other because you realize that he 
might be faster, but that you are stronger). RCT suggests that responding with the less 
dominant response requires control and, thus, more time (Coles et al., 1985). This 
explanation has been supported with the use of the Stroop color-naming task (Stroop, 1935), 
in which it is easier to identify the color red when the word says “RED” than when the word 
says “BLUE” because word reading is the prepotent response. Thus, color-naming requires 
control.   
Additionally, RCT can be used to explain the findings of priming studies in that 
incompatible trials can lead both the prepotent (but incorrect) response and the correct 
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 response to be activated, slowing reaction time. Thus, when an incompatible trial is presented 
the incorrect response can be activated first, prior to activating and implementing the correct 
response. For example, both Whites and Blacks can be dangerous, but the link between Black 
and the concept “dangerous” is prepotent (due to stereotypes) and therefore is activated first. 
Thus, in order to identify a Black person as “safe”, it is necessary to first override the initial 
dominant response (dangerous) to make the correct response. Correcting the dominant, 
incorrect response and activating the correct one can take more time, thus leading to longer 
reaction times on correct incompatible trials that ultimately are responded to correctly.   
Support for RCT comes from cognitive research illustrating that response competition 
occurs when subjects must quickly categorize numerous kinds of stimuli among distracting 
information (e.g., Eriksen, O’Hara, & Eriksen, 1982). The flanker task was developed by 
Eriksen and Eriksen (1974) for assessing the control of attention to information presented 
among distracters (often target letters presented among other letters). In the flanker task, 
participants respond to a centrally-located target stimulus presented among an array of other 
contextual stimuli (i.e., the flankers). In a typical flanker task, the flankers are mapped to one 
response or the other (in the 2-choice versions of the task), such that they elicit either the 
same response as the target (i.e., compatible with correct response) or the opposite response 
(i.e., incompatible with correct response; Bartholow et al., 2005; Coles et al., 1985; Gratton 
et al., 1988, 1992; Sanders & Lamers, 2002). Because compatible flankers elicit the same 
response as the target, processing compatible flankers facilitates the correct response. On the 
other hand, the response activated by incompatible flankers is the opposite of the one elicited 
by the target, so participants need to control their attention and focus on the target in order to 
make a correct response. Because of this processing conflict, incompatible flankers have 
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 been shown to slow participants’ speed in responding to the target (Dallas & Merickle, 1976; 
Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; see also Coles et al., 1995). The difference in reaction times based 
on the compatibility of the flankers is called the noise-compatibility effect, first noted by 
Eriksen and Eriksen (1974). The size of the noise-compatibility effect is thought to index the 
degree of response conflict between two response options.  
Besides using simple stimuli such as letters or numbers, the noise-compatibility effect 
has been replicated with socially-relevant stimuli. Using such stimuli can help researchers to 
understand the control of attention in social categorization. In the case of categorizing by 
race, if participants are automatically activating racial stereotypes upon perceiving a target 
person, it should be easier for participants to categorize the target when stereotype-consistent 
flankers are visually presented, as opposed to when stereotype-inconsistent flankers are 
presented. In other words, to the extent that a cue (target) and a stereotype-related trait 
(flanker) activate different response tendencies (e.g., a Black face and a counter-stereotypical 
word), a noise-compatibility effect should be evident in response latency. A recent series of 
studies by Dickter and Bartholow (2006) illustrates how flanker paradigms can help explore 
the role of attention during social categorization. In these studies, participants categorized 
targets according to race (Experiment 1) or gender (Experiment 2) as quickly as possible in 
the presence of distracting flanker information. Participants were faster to categorize targets 
when distracters represented the same racial or gender category as the target, and appeared to 
strategically control their attention to distracters. Physiological data indicated differential 
allocation of attention to ingroup and outgroup targets on the basis of race. That is, White 
participants paid more attention first to Black targets and later to White targets but Black 
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 participants paid more attention first to White targets and later to Black targets, as indexed by 
particular components of their brain waves (to be discussed in more detail later).  
Another experiment using the flanker paradigm to study social stimuli (in this case, 
gender) was conducted by Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Calvini (1999). In this study, 
participants indicated whether names were male (e.g., Peter) or female (e.g., Angela). The 
names were presented centrally, and on some trials were flanked by laterally-presented 
names representing the opposite category of the target, which they referred to as 
“mismatching” trials. In accordance with the noise-compatibility effect, Macrae et al. found 
that response times were slowed on mismatching trials compared to control trials (in which 
flanker words were household objects), at least when flankers were presented in close 
proximity to the target names. This finding supports the idea that local context can influence 
social categorization processes, but suggests that attention to context information is 
automatic.  Taken together, results from these studies suggest that flanker paradigms can be 
used to understand more about the social categorization process as well as to examine the 
control of attention to various social categories, most notably race.  
The Nature of Anti-Black Stereotypes 
Taken together, research involving implicit prejudice procedures and social 
categorization studies indicate that White American participants automatically activate 
negative stereotypes about Blacks, and to some extent Black Americans hold similar negative 
stereotypes about their ingroup (Correll et al., 2002). However, despite the voluminous 
research on stereotype activation and its effects, the exact nature of these stereotypes has 
remained unclear. In Devine’s (1989) classic experiment, participants were asked to list 
common cultural stereotypes about Blacks. Some common negative stereotypes identified by 
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 the participants were: poor, aggressive/tough, criminal, low intelligence, uneducated, lazy, 
sexually perverse, ostentatious, inferior, and dirty/smelly. Negative stereotypes identified by 
participants in Lepore and Brown’s (1997) study included: lazy, violent, criminal, poor, 
uneducated, sexist, rude, unintegrated, smelly, persecuted, and superstitious. Priming studies 
that have presented racial stereotypes about Blacks have used similar words to elicit the 
automatic activation of stereotypes in their participants. For example, Dovidio and colleagues 
(1997) used the following negative Black stereotypes as primes: crime, stupid, poor, messy, 
violent, lazy, danger, threat, rude, loud, harm, and deceive. Clearly, both participants and 
researchers have used a variety of negative words as “typical” characteristics identified as 
stereotypes about Black Americans. 
However, there is limited research focused on which of these aspects of the stereotype 
is the most prevalent or most tightly coupled with the category. Is one Black stereotype more 
common than another? Which stereotype is immediately activated upon perceiving a Black 
person? Some researchers have suggested that the most prevalent Black stereotype is that 
African-Americans are more likely to have violent and criminal dispositions (Quillian & 
Pager, 2001). In fact, many studies have identified violent traits such as hostility, aggression 
and criminality as the most prevalent stereotype for Blacks (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Payne, 
2001). Americans consistently rate Blacks as more violent than any other ethnic groups; in 
one study, 52% of Whites rated Blacks a 6 or higher on a 1-10 scale of aggressiveness 
(Sniderman & Piazza, 1993). The stereotype of Blacks as violent is widely known and has 
not changed through the decades, regardless of individual prejudice level (Devine & Elliot, 
1995). In fact, surveys have found that the “aggression and violence” stereotype is the most 
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 frequently endorsed racial stereotype for Blacks among White Americans (Sniderman & 
Piazza, 1993).  
Why would the stereotype of violence be the one most tightly paired with the 
category of Blacks? Some researchers have suggested that there is a symbolic association 
among human beings that links darkness with evil, threat, and danger (e.g., Schaller, Park, & 
Mueller, 2003) and that this symbolic association has psychological consequences that lead 
people in many cultures to favor lighter-skinned people over darker-skinned individuals; this 
has been found even among young children (Iwawaki, Sonoo, Williams, & Best, 1979). 
Thus, those with a darker skin tone might activate a fear response at a basic level, suggesting 
that the association between Blacks and fear is adaptive. Other theorists suggest that a threat 
response may be partially due to general dissimilarity, as minorities may be seen as a threat 
to individuals’ self-identities and/or group identities (e.g., Strauss, Connerley, & 
Ammermann, 2003), contributing again to the idea that holding these stereotypes may be 
adaptive. 
The stereotype of Blacks as violent and the response of fearfulness among Whites in 
response to this stereotype leads to extremely harmful interactions between Blacks and 
individuals who activate these stereotypes. Unfortunately, these situations are not limited to 
the laboratory in that there are many cases of police officers making quick judgments about 
shooting an alleged perpetrator with incomplete information. The most notable of these cases 
have involved the shooting and killing of unarmed Black suspects who acted in an 
ambiguous manner that the police decided, in the heat of the moment, was potentially 
dangerous. One such example occurred in 1999 when four plain-clothes White New York 
police officers shot and killed Amadou Diallo, an unarmed Black man. The police officers 
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 were searching for a suspect in a Bronx neighborhood who was accused of rape. After the 
shooting, the officers claimed that Diallo resembled the rape suspect. According to witnesses, 
Diallo was standing in the doorway of his apartment building when the police approached 
and ordered him to “freeze.” Diallo, an immigrant, reached into his pants pocket in an action 
the officers misunderstood as an effort to pull out a gun. As Diallo’s hand entered his pocket, 
the officers opened fire in a hail of 41 bullets, killing Diallo. Only later were they able to 
determine that he had been unarmed. After the case, the officers were met with a slew of 
public and professional allegations, including charges of racial profiling. All of the officers 
were later acquitted of all charges – they were found to have been justified in their actions 
because Diallo had moved when they told him to stay still. This real-world tragedy is 
particularly interesting in the current context in that it demonstrates the impact that automatic 
cognition can have on behavior in an ambiguous situation, or in a situation in which there is 
incomplete information. Thus, the officers in this case could have, upon seeing Diallo, 
automatically categorized him as belonging to the category “Black,” and subsequently 
activated the stereotype of “violent,” leading them to interpret Diallo’s ambiguous actions as 
violent. 
In fact, laboratory research has also offered support for this very point. Keith Payne 
(2001) conducted a priming study inspired by the Diallo shooting in which participants were 
shown photographs of White and Black male faces followed by pictures of target objects, 
either handguns (violent stimuli) or hand tools (neutral stimuli). Participants were asked to 
respond not to the face stimuli, but only to the pictures of guns or tools. The experimenters 
informed the participants that the faces were only there to signal that the pictures of the target 
objects were about to be presented on the screen. The task of the participants was to identify 
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 the target objects as either a gun or a tool by pressing one of two keys; they were told to 
respond as quickly as possible. As expected, participants made more errors in identifying 
tools as guns when primed with a Black face than with a White face, and were also faster to 
correctly identify guns when they were primed with Black faces. Racial bias in performance 
on the priming paradigm was not related to explicit racial attitudes, as measured by a self-
report racism scale.  
In a similar study entitled “The Police Officer’s Dilemma,” White participants 
completed a task in which they had to decide whether to shoot White or Black armed or 
unarmed male targets in a computer simulation game (Correll et al., 2002). Results indicated 
that participants were faster to shoot Black targets than White targets and faster to decide not 
to shoot White targets than Black targets. Participants also made more errors when they 
chose to shoot Black targets; that is, they required less time and had a higher error rate when 
deciding to shoot Black targets, regardless if the target was armed or unarmed. Interestingly, 
the researchers’ reported index of shooter bias (reaction time) was stronger in participants 
who self-reported being aware that there is a strong stereotype that Blacks were aggressive, 
violent, and dangerous; shooter bias was also stronger in participants who self-reported more 
contact with Blacks. No correlation was found, however, among reaction time and prejudice 
level or motivation to control prejudice. These findings offer support for Devine’s (1989) 
theory that stereotypes are the result of learning over time and can be automatically activated 
regardless of prejudice level. Thus, simply being aware of a stereotype is enough to induce 
biased behavior. Finally, this study replicated the results with Black participants, finding 
equivalent levels of bias among the two groups, further suggesting that awareness of the 
stereotype and not prejudice level is causing automatic racial bias. Taken together, the above 
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 studies offer evidence that the “violent” stereotype is the stereotype most associated with the 
category of Blacks and is automatically activated upon perceiving a Black target. 
Additionally, the activation of this stereotype may have behavioral implications in the lab 
and the real world. 
Psychophysiological Measures of Stereotyping 
Although reaction time studies that measure the implicit activation of racial 
stereotypes have provided important information about the properties of stereotyping, such 
studies are limited in a number of ways. For example, although often discussed as reflecting 
cognitive processes, reaction time data actually reflect the outcome of some cognitive 
operation(s) rather than those operations themselves. That is, RT data confound concept 
activation with response output processes (Ito, Thompson, & Cacioppo, 2004). Thus, 
behavioral data such as RTs cannot indicate the level at which stereotype activation occurs 
because reaction time is confounded by the speed of motor-related response processes 
(Bartholow, Dickter, & Sestir, 2006). It is often desirable and perhaps necessary to expand 
the behavioral research on stereotype activation to a methodology that allows the 
examination of multiple components of the stereotype activation process. 
Psychophysiological measures can provide a multifaceted look at the underlying neural 
events associated with the activation of stereotypes. 
Recently, prominent social psychologists have adopted psychophysiological methods 
because of the additional information they can provide over more traditional behavioral 
methods. First, physiological measures can be used to identify the effects of a stimulus that 
participants are unable or unwilling to report (for a review, see Guglielmi, 1999). When 
studying stereotypes, this can be extremely useful as participants often have egalitarian 
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 beliefs, or may be unwilling to admit racist attitudes. Additionally, physiological changes can 
often be temporally related to observable stimuli, making it possible to assess exactly when 
an effect occurred and to separate component processes in the stream of information 
processing (Stern, Ray, & Quigley, 2001). Measures that are temporally accurate are 
important in studying racial categorization in that they can distinguish between automatic and 
controlled processes. Finally, physiological measures are linked to cognitive processing as 
well as affective changes that are of interest to social psychologists (Hugdahl, 1995).  
Although a variety of physiological measures have been used to study racial attitudes 
going back many decades (e.g., Rankin & Campbell, 1955), researchers interested in the time 
course of cognitive activity associated with categorization and stereotyping in recent years 
have measured event-related brain potentials (ERPs). ERPs are determined by averaging 
electroencephalogram (EEG) signals obtained from the scalp over time and across multiple 
presentations of stimuli. This signal averaging technique ultimately separates activity 
associated with stimulus processing from spontaneous, background EEG activity (Cacioppo, 
Crites, Gardner, & Berntson, 1994; Stern, Ray, & Quigley, 2001). ERPs are generally 
described in terms of components, which typically include information about polarity 
(positive and negative deflections from baseline) and temporal order relative to event onset 
(milliseconds [ms] post-stimulus at which they occur). For example, the P300 component is a 
prominent positive deflection in the waveform that occurs approximately 300 ms (or later) 
following stimulus onset (see Hugdahl, 1995). Each component is thought to reflect 
engagement of a particular cognitive process or information-processing event. The amplitude 
of components is thought to reflect the degree to which a particular information-processing 
operation is engaged (Fabiani & Donchin, 1985) while the latency at which a component 
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 peaks reflects the speed with which a stimulus is categorized and its evaluative implications 
processed (Rugg & Coles, 1995). Importantly, the latency of most components is 
independent of response latency, allowing researchers to separate relevant concept activation 
and irrelevant response preparation and implementation processes (see Ito et al., 2004). 
Additionally, these components can be either exogenous, in which case they reflect the 
automatic processing of the physical characteristics of an external stimulus or endogenous, 
which are associated with activation of higher cognitive processes like attention and memory 
(Fabiani, Gratton, & Coles, 2000).  
ERPs are an important measurement tool in studies involving stereotype activation 
because they can identify the cognitive processes that mediate between the presentation of a 
stimulus and overt behavior and the representations on which these processes operate (Rugg 
& Coles, 1995). In addition to not being dependent on the speed of motor processes and task 
requirements (Ito & Cacioppo, 2000), ERPs are useful because of their excellent temporal 
resolution; that is, the ERP is time-locked to the presentation of a specific event or stimulus, 
and thus is a direct manifestation of processing related to that event or stimulus (or lack of a 
stimulus). Once a stimulus is presented, ERPs illustrate precisely, on the order of 
milliseconds, when particular aspects of information processing are carried out. 
Several studies involving ERPs provide preliminary evidence that fear may be 
underlying White’s reactions to Black stereotypes. Specifically, ERP research has 
demonstrated that White participants direct more early attention implicitly to Black faces 
than to White faces, particularly to Black males (Ito & Urland, 2003; Dickter & Bartholow, 
2006). Although some researchers suggest that Black males may capture more attention 
because they differ from the White male norm framework (Smith & Zarate, 1992), it may be 
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 the case that more attention is directed toward Blacks, and especially Black males, because of 
the threatening stereotype associated with that social group. Thus, because of the prevalence 
of stereotypes about Blacks (especially Black males) in our culture including information 
about violence and aggression (Ito & Urland, 2003), Black targets might elicit fear in 
perceivers, causing them to direct more attention toward these faces. Consistent with this 
idea, recent research has demonstrated that participants give greater attention to threatening 
facial expressions than faces with neutral or happy expressions (Lundqvist & Ohman, 2005). 
Additionally, a review chapter summarizing years of research on threat responses concluded 
that the cognitive processing of threat leads to heightened attention to threat cues (Mogg & 
Bradley, 2005). Thus, when a stimulus is perceived as threatening, people direct more 
attention to it. In this way, then, it may be adaptive for individuals to attend more to Black 
faces if the stereotype they activate upon perceiving a Black person is threatening, such as 
one of violence or aggression (Ito & Urland, 2003; but see Dickter & Bartholow, 2006 and 
more discussion below). 
Research involving other physiological techniques has also shown support for the 
“Black as violent” stereotype as underlying these findings. Functional magnetic resonance 
imaging, or fMRI, has also been used to examine the automatic activation of racial 
stereotypes (Hart, Whalen, Shin, McInerney, Fischer, & Rauch, 2000; Phelps, O’Connor, 
Cunningham, Funayama, Gatenby, Gore, & Banaji, 2000; Richeson, Baird, Gordon, 
Heatherton, Wyland, Trawalter, & Shelton, 2003). Briefly, fMRI measures blood flow to 
parts of the brain, which researchers have associated with various neural and cognitive 
activity. Although the technique has poor temporal resolution compared to ERPs (i.e, it has 
the resolution of seconds, as compared to milliseconds), fMRI has better spatial resolution 
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 than ERPs, allowing for identification of specific brain structures involved in neural activity. 
Several researchers have examined the link between the amygdala and the processing of race 
information. Neuroscientists have long believed the amygdala to be implicated in the 
production of behaviors associated with fear and fear-related memory storage (Gale, 
Anagnostaras, Godsil, Mitcell, Nozawa, Sage, Wiltgen, & Fanselow, 2004). The amygdala, 
located in the anterior region of the temporal lobes, has been shown to be activated when 
participants are conditioned to be fearful of a neutral stimulus that has been paired with an 
aversive stimulus, and is thought to be an index of the detection of threat (e.g., LeDoux, 
1996). In fact, when lesions are made to the amygdala, they produce large deficits in fear 
responses to auditory, visual, and contextual stimuli (Kim & Davis, 1993). Phelps and 
colleagues have shown that in humans, the amygdala is also associated with “the expression 
of learned emotional responses that have been acquired without direct aversive experience” 
(Phelps et al., 2000, p. 730; see also Phelps, LaBar, Anderson, O’Connor, Fulbright, & 
Spencer, 1998). Furthermore, the amygdala is specifically involved in perceiving faces, and 
has been shown in fMRI studies to distinguish between faces exhibiting fear as opposed to 
other emotions, even when these faces are presented subliminally (Phelps et al., 2000). 
In one study in which activation of the amygdala was assessed with fMRI techniques, 
White American participants viewed photographs of Black and White male faces with neutral 
facial expressions (Phelps et al., 2000). In this study, participants exhibited different strength 
amygdala activation to Black versus White faces. This pattern was only achieved, however, 
when participants viewed pictures of unfamiliar Blacks and Whites. That is, when pictures of 
famous, well-liked Blacks and Whites were viewed, these patterns were not replicated. 
Similar results were found in a later study when individual differences in the motivation to 
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 respond without prejudice (an explicit measure) were shown to moderate startle eyeblink 
responses to pictures of Black and White faces (Amodio et al., 2003). In a typical startle 
eyeblink study, participants experience a startle probe such as a burst of white noise, and 
larger startle eyeblink responses are associated with negative affective states (Amodio et al., 
2003). Interestingly, Amodio and colleagues did not find group differences in startle eyeblink 
responses to Asian faces. Since this finding could not be explained by unfamiliarity of the 
outgroup given that Asians are just as unfamiliar as Blacks, the authors attributed their 
effects to the fact that the Asian stereotype does not include threatening attributes, where the 
Black stereotype does.  
Taken together, the results from the above two studies suggest that the amygdala’s 
response to faces of different races is not a function simply of race, but of stereotypes that are 
automatically activated when perceiving an unfamiliar Black person. These results support 
the idea of the Black as fear stereotype theory in that unfamiliar Black targets elicit a larger 
fear reaction in White participants than unfamiliar White targets or familiar Black targets. 
Additionally, because familiar Black targets elicit less amygdala activation than unfamiliar 
Black targets or Asian targets, these findings do not support the theory that viewing outgroup 
members elicits greater attention because they deviate from a cultural norm, as suggested by 
others (Ito & Urland, 2003; Smith & Zarate, 1992). Finally, because amygdala activation to 
Black and White targets was correlated with a measure of implicit race bias (the startle 
reflex), but not a measure of explicit race bias (a self-reported racism scale), this suggests a 
moderating role of prejudice level on racial bias at the automatic level. Taken together, the 
results from these two studies offer support for the idea that stereotype-consistent 
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 information is encoded and retrieved relatively automatically, and may be separate from self-
report levels of prejudice which involve a more controlled process. 
The Current Research 
The first objective in designing the current research studies was to examine the 
effects of contextual information on the social categorization process at the behavioral and 
the neural level. That is, at which point in the social categorization process does contextual 
information affect processing? Previous research has suggested that providing contextual 
information can lead participants to identify a multiply-categorizable individual in different 
ways by activating a particular category (Macrae et al., 1991). However, less research has 
demonstrated how activating stereotypes or other concepts consistent or inconsistent with 
social categories will affect the categorization process. The following studies were designed 
to examine the timecourse of this process – to understand when, in the course of information 
processing, contextual information has an impact. Therefore, a modified flanker paradigm 
was utilized in which faces of Black and White males were presented as target stimuli and 
words related to emotions (Experiment 1) and stereotypes (Experiment 2) were presented as 
flankers (distracters). It was expected that, because of the concepts that these flanker words 
activate, this information would affect the speed at which participants racially categorized the 
targets. That is, it was expected that incompatible trials (negative emotions or stereotypes 
paired with Whites; positive emotions or stereotypes paired with Blacks) would be processed 
more slowly than compatible trials (negative words with Black faces; positive words with 
White faces). Additionally, it was hypothesized that incompatible trials would elicit more 
response conflict and that this effect would be manifest in both behavior and eletrocortical 
responses (see below). 
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 Secondly, this research was designed to explore the role of attention in the 
categorization process. As reviewed previously, studies have found that White participants 
allocate more attention to Black targets early in processing, while directing more attention to 
White targets at later processing stages (e.g., Dickter & Bartholow, 2006; Ito & Urland, 
2003, 2005). Although this finding has been consistent across several studies, the 
mechanisms driving these differences are still unclear, as is their functional significance for 
behavior. For example, it may be the case that early attention to Blacks is due to a fear-
related stereotype that is activated upon perception of a Black face. If this hypothesis is 
correct, then it would be expected that attention to Black faces might predict behavior on a 
racial bias task. Alternatively, participants may first be attending more to outgroup members 
and then they may shift to their attention to ingroup members, so that stereotype activation 
does not necessarily influence early processing. In this case, it would not be expected that 
attention to racial groups would predict behavior on a racial bias task. In order to test 
competing hypotheses, participants completed the flanker task described above as well as the 
Payne (2001) weapons task. As reviewed previously, the weapons task provides separate 
estimates of automatic and controlled aspects of race bias. To the extent that race processing 
differences evident in ERPs have some functional significance for race bias, there should be 
an association between the size of the ERP effects in the Flanker task and the amount of race 
bias shown in the weapon task, particularly the automatic component. 
The final goal of the current research was to examine the nature of the Black 
stereotype. It is clear from RT studies, psychophysiological experiments, and self-report 
studies that the category of Blacks is activating a schema involving violence, which in turn 
produces a fearful response in perceivers. However, although many studies have documented 
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 the association of the social group “Blacks” with fearful traits such as violence or 
aggressiveness, it is still unclear if this stereotype is more associated with Blacks than are 
other negative stereotypes. In other words, there are no studies directly comparing the 
automatic activation of negative stereotypes to each other to identify differences in the 
activation potential of different aspects of the Black stereotype. This distinction may be 
theoretically important in terms elucidating of the nature of the Black stereotype, and may 
have practical significance in terms of providing insights into how to combat anti-Black 
stereotypes. A key hypothesis of the current research is that the stereotype most linked with 
Blacks is the one that activates a fear response in individuals. Because of theories linking 
darkness with threat (e.g., Schaller et al., 2003) that suggest that a fear reaction to the group 
might be adaptive (Hurwitz & Peffley, 1997), it is hypothesized that these strong reactions 
will lead threatening stereotypes to be more pervasive and more associated with Blacks. 
Due to the limited available data on this issue, a pilot study was conducted in order to 
examine the hypothesis that fear-related Black stereotypes will differ from the non-fear-
related Black stereotypes at the automatic level in their degree of association with the Black 
category. In the pilot study, 48 participants engaged in a computer RT task where they 
identified strings of letters as either words or non-words (i.e., lexical decision task) following 
the brief (300 ms) presentation of a Black or White male face (i.e., prime). The letter strings 
made up 5 different conditions: Black fear-related stereotypes (e.g., aggressive, hostile), 
Black negative non-fear-related stereotypes (e.g., lazy, stupid), positive words (e.g., smart, 
honest), neutral words (e.g., average, moderate), and non-words (e.g., sarf, philst).  
 In order to reduce the positive skew common to RT data, outliers below 300 ms and 
above 1000 ms were removed for the analyses. The remaining RTs were log-transformed, 
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 and these logged data were used for all analyses. The data were analyzed with a repeated 
measures ANOVA with 10 within-subjects conditions, yielding a 2 (race of prime: Black or 
White) x 5 (word: fear, negative, neutral, positive, or non-word) design. As expected, the 
analysis showed a significant main effect for word type, F (4, 44) = 14.90, p < .001. Planned 
comparisons were conducted to examine specific predictions. These comparisons examined 
the means for the fear words compared to each other word type within and across target race. 
Comparisons revealed a significant difference between the fear word condition and the 
neutral word condition for Black prime trials, t (48) = 3.63, p < .01, but not for White prime 
trials, t (48) = 0.07, p > .10 (see Table 1 for RT differences). This finding suggests that fear 
words are processed significantly faster than neutral words after presentation of a Black 
target but not a White target, indicating that there is a strong association between Blacks and 
a fear response compared to Whites. Furthermore, there was a marginal difference between 
Black and White targets in the fear condition (t [48] = 1.42, p < .07) but not in the negative 
condition (t [48] = 0.00, p > .10), suggesting that fear is associated with Black targets more 
so than other negative stereotypes. The results from the pilot study provide preliminary 
evidence that the stereotype that is automatically activated upon presentation of a Black 
target is specifically a fear response, more so than just a negative stereotype.  
Based on the promise in these pilot results, two studies were designed that employed 
the flanker paradigm and the weapons task in order to accomplish the goals of the current 
research. This research was designed around the idea that a combined behavioral and 
electrocortical approach to measurement would provide a more comprehensive 
understanding of categorization and stereotype activation than has been possible with either 
measure alone.  
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 This research involved the examination of several different ERP components related 
to the current goals. These components fall into 2 categories: early attention and later 
evaluative processes. The short-latency early attentional endogenous components of the ERP 
that were explored include the N100, P200, and N200. Research involving these early 
components has suggested that the categorization of a person into a generic category takes 
place in the first 100-200 ms after the stimulus (Ito & Urland, 2003). Thus, early after 
stimulus presentation, participants are attending to social stimuli presented in the visual field. 
The N100 usually peaks at about 100 ms post-stimulus while the P200 has its peak at about 
200 ms. The P200 has recently been specifically linked to perceptions of threat (Ito & 
Correll, under review) as well as the identification of angry faces (Schutter, de Haan, & van 
Honk, 2004). Thus, it is expected that the P200 should be larger for threatening stimuli, such 
as Black faces, particularly when Black faces are flanked by threat-related words. 
The N200 has been associated with the avoidance of inappropriate responses, which 
may occur when there is response conflict between prepotent but inappropriate response 
tendencies and alternative responses (Bartholow, Pearson, Dickter, Sher, Fabiani, & Gratton, 
2005; Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den Wildenberg, & Ridderinkhoff, 2003). Thus, trials in 
which flanker words subtly activate racial categories that are incompatible with the racial 
category of the target should elicit larger N200s. For example, recent research has indicated 
that the amplitude of the N200 is larger when a tool is misidentified as a gun following a 
Black face prime (in the Payne [2001] weapon identification task) than following a White 
face prime (Bartholow, Payne, & Henry, 2005). This finding suggests that the conflict 
inherent in attempting to overcome a tendency to “shoot” is greater on Black prime trials 
than on White prime trials.  
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 Another endogenous component of the ERP is the P300, which is a component 
associated with later evaluative processing. The P300 usually peaks between 300 and 600 ms 
post-stimulus and takes place when the participant is actively attending to the stimulus. The 
P300 is largest following a novel or surprising stimulus, such as an expectancy violation 
(Bartholow, Fabiani, Gratton, & Bettencourt, 2001; Hugdahl, 1995). Additionally, stimuli 
that elicit large P300s are generally remembered better than stimuli that elicit smaller P300s 
(Fabiani & Donchin, 1995; Bartholow et al., 2001). Such findings have led to the hypothesis 
that the P300 is a manifestation of working memory updating (Donchin & Coles, 1988). 
Large P300s also occur when there is a difference between the evaluative categorization of a 
target stimulus and the stimulus that would be expected based on a pre-established context 
(Cacioppo et al., 1993). Research has suggested that the P300 is also an index of task 
irrelevant categorization processes (Ito & Cacioppo, 2000). That is, it may be an index of 
implicit cognitive processes to which the participant is not explicitly attending such as the 
categorization and recognition of race and gender (Ito & Urland, 2003). Finally, P300 latency 
has been linked to stimulus evaluation or categorization time. Specifically, studies have 
shown that the correlation between P300 latency and reaction time is stronger when 
participants are given accuracy as opposed to speed instructions and that as categorization 
becomes more difficult, P300 latencies become longer. Thus, P300 latency can serve as an 
indicator of the categorization of racial groups or stereotypes which, unlike RT, is not 
dependent upon the duration of response-related motor processes or task-relevant response 
selection requirements (Kutas, McCarthy, & Donchin, 1977; McCarthy & Donchin, 1981; 
Smid, Mulder, Mulder, & Brands, 1992). 
In summary, the following hypotheses were advanced for this research: 
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 1. Context information was expected to affect the processing of target stimuli in 
the flanker task at all stages of processing. That is, behavioral results as 
indexed by reaction time were expected to be facilitated when flanker words 
were compatible with the target race, but inhibit reaction time when flanker 
words were incompatible with the target race. It was also expected that 
psychophysiological data would be affected by context information as well, in 
that incompatible conditions would lead to larger N200s, which signify 
response conflict. 
2. It was also hypothesized that participants would allocate more attention to 
Black targets than to White targets early in processing, regardless of context 
information. Thus, early attentional components of the ERP were expected to 
be larger to Blacks than Whites. It was also hypothesized that attention would 
then shift to White targets, again indexed by early attentional components. 
3. A third hypothesis was that the stereotype most linked with Blacks would be a 
fear-related stereotype. Thus, participants were expected to have quicker 
reaction times to trials in which fear-related words were presented 
simultaneously with Black faces, relative to other trials, including those 
involving negative words. 
4. Because the P200 has been associated with threatening stimuli, it was 
expected that conditions that contain threatening stimuli would elicit larger 
P200s. Thus, larger P200 amplitudes were expected for conditions that 
involved Black targets as well as those conditions with fear-related words.  
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 5. Finally, an exploratory hypothesis advanced for this research was that ERP 
measures of differential attention to race, assessed during the flanker task, 
would correlate with behavioral manifestations of race bias assessed by the 
weapons task. This hypothesis was based on the notion that early attention to 
race should have implications for behavioral manifestations of race bias. That 
is, the same automatic process was expected to play a role in both 
neurological components during the categorization task and the behavioral 










Thirty-seven White undergraduates from the University of Missouri-Columbia 
completed this experiment for course credit in an introductory psychology class. All 
participants were healthy adults between the ages of 18 and 25 and were right-handed. 
Participants signed up for the experiment using a web-based system in which prerequisites 
stated that individuals with health problems and those who were left-handed were ineligible. 
In addition, upon arrival at the lab, participants were required to complete and sign an 
informed consent form (see Appendix I) and the experimenter made sure that all participants 
were healthy and right-handed. The health requirement was necessary for the study due to the 
psychophysiological nature of the recording devices. That is, individuals with serious health 
difficulties, particularly neurological disease or head trauma, often show abnormal response 
patterns on ERP measures. Only right-handed participants were used to ensure that 
hemispheric motor cortex development would be similar across all participants, and to 
eliminate the need to add another between-subjects factor to the analyses to control for 
handedness. 
Materials and Experimental Paradigm 
Stimuli and Paradigm: Flanker Task. Pictures of 6 White male faces and 6 Black 
male faces, all of which had been used as targets in a previous study (Ito & Urland, 2003), 
were used as target stimuli in this experiment. Each photograph displayed a face of either a 
 Black or a White man or woman and was cropped so that only the facial area was shown, in 
order to control for the influence of extraneous information such as jewelry, clothing, or 
background. All pictures were pre-tested for attractiveness and likeability, and had at least 
80% agreement in race judgments. Additionally, all targets had a neutral expression on their 
faces and all pictures were of equal size.  
Flanker stimuli were words that fit into 6 different categories of emotion: anxiety, 
anger, fear, happiness, sadness, and disgust. Words were chosen to be synonyms of each 
emotion and all words were matched across condition in word length and frequency in the 
English language (see Appendix II for a list of words used; Kucera & Francis, 1982). There 
were 12 within-subjects conditions in this experiment: each of the six emotion categories was 
paired with an equal number of Black and White targets during the task. 
Stimuli were presented in a modified flanker task (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974). On each 
trial, a target face was displayed in the middle of the screen and 4 flanker words were 
simultaneously displayed above, below, and on either side of the target face. Each trial 
consisted of a 200 ms pre-stimulus baseline period followed by presentation of the stimulus 
array, which appeared on the screen for 500 ms with a random inter-trial interval ranging 
from 1000-1200 ms. Participants completed 12 blocks of 72 trials each. At a viewing 
distance of approximately 90 cm, the stimulus arrays subtended a visual angel of 
approximately 30 degrees. Participants were instructed to categorize the target according to 
race (Black or White) by pressing one of two keys (counterbalanced across participants) and 
were told to ignore the flanker words. Care was taken to ensure that no objects were in the 
participants’ peripheral vision and that the screen was the only salient visual image. 
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 Stimuli and Paradigm: Weapons Task. All stimuli were identical to the weapons 
paradigm designed by Payne (see Payne, 2001). Pictures of two Black males and two White 
males were used as primes. The faces were cropped so that extraneous information could not 
be seen and each person was wearing a neutral expression. Target stimuli were four pictures 
of tools and four pictures of handguns, all equal in size. 
In accordance with Payne’s (2001; Experiment 2) procedure, stimuli were presented 
in trials that consisted of a prime face quickly followed by a target stimulus (i.e., a gun or a 
tool). Each prime was presented for 100 ms and was immediately replaced by the target 
stimulus, which appeared on the screen for 200 ms. The only difference between Payne’s 
procedure and the one used here is the timing of stimulus presentation. That is, the inter-
stimulus interval in the present experiment was 1000 ms (in Payne’s [2001] study, it was 500 
ms) and no responses were accepted after 500 ms, which was necessary in order to measure 
stimulus-locked ERP components. Participants were told that the face prime would signal 
that the target stimulus was about to appear and they were instructed to classify the target as 
either a gun or a tool by pressing one of two buttons on the response box. Participants were 
required to respond quickly and accurately. If they did not respond within 500 ms, the 
message “Respond Faster!” appeared on the screen in red letters until the next trial. The 
paradigm consisted of 288 trials, which were presented in 4 blocks of 72 trials each. There 
were 4 trial conditions: Black prime with gun; Black prime with tool; White prime with gun; 





 Psychophysiological Data Collection and Reduction 
The electroencephalogram (EEG) was recorded from 28 scalp sites using tin 
electrodes sewn into an electrode cap (Electrocap, International, Easton, OH), according to 
an extended 10/20 system (American Encephalographic Society, 1991). Active scalp sites 
were referenced online to the right mastoid; an average mastoid reference was derived off-
line. Vertical and horizontal movements (EOG) were recorded with electrodes placed above 
and below the left eye and on the outer canthus of each eye. Electrode impedances were kept 
below 5 KΩ at all sites. EEG was sampled at 250 Hz using Neuroscan Synamps 
(Compumedics USA, El Paso, TX) amplifiers and was filtered online at .01 to 40 Hz. A 
regression-based procedure was used to remove the effects of ocular artifacts (Semlitsch, 
Anderer, Schuster, & Presslich, 1986). Trials containing voltage deflections of ± 75 
microvolts (µV) were removed prior to averaging. Averages were further filtered offline at 
12 Hz. Finally, the data were averaged according to participant, electrode, and stimulus 
condition. 
Procedure 
After participants completed the consent form, the experimenter explained that the 
purpose of the study was to assess facial recognition amid distraction. Participants were 
seated with both feet on the ground in front of a computer in a comfortable chair where they 
familiarized themselves with the response box, which contained two buttons, each mapped 
on to one target response (i.e., Black or White). The button associated with each response 
was counter-balanced across participants. The experimenter explained the instructions for the 
flanker task and then attached and tested the electrodes. Participants were instructed to only 
respond to the race of the target face and to ignore the flanker words. They were told to 
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 respond as quickly as possible to the target faces and to try to stay alert throughout the 
duration of the task. Additionally, the experimenter explained that a small video camera 
would be used to monitor coughing, sneezing, excessive blinking, and sleepiness, as these 
behaviors can affect EEG activity. Before beginning the actual trials, participants completed 
20 practice trials in which the experimenter was able to check that the equipment was 
working properly and that participants understood the task. No participants had trouble 
understanding the task. When it was determined that participants were completing the trials 
in a quick and accurate manner, the experimenter left the room and participants started the 
experimental trials. During the task, participants moved at their own pace between blocks, 
allowing time to rest their eyes.  
After the first task was completed, participants were allowed to rest for a few minutes 
before beginning the second task. After the period of rest, the experimenter explained the 
instructions for the weapons task and the participant was left alone again to complete it. For 
both parts of the experiment, the responses were recorded in milliseconds (ms) by 
Presentation software (Neurobehavioral Systems, Inc.), which also recorded the number of 
misses, hits, and false alarms. After the trials of the weapons task were completed, the 
experimenter carefully removed all the electrodes and the participants were given time to 
clean up in a private room with a sink. The experimenter then carefully debriefed each 
participant (see Appendix III for debriefing). Each participant was in the laboratory for 







EXPERIMENT 1 RESULTS 
 
Flanker Task: RT Data 
 
 Only correct trial reaction times (RTs) were used in the analyses reported here. RTs ± 
3 SD from the mean also were eliminated prior to analyses (see Fazio, 1990). The remaining 
average RTs were then subjected to a 6 (Emotion: anxiety, anger, fear, happiness, sadness, 
disgust) x 2 (Target Race: Black or White) repeated measures ANOVA. Mean RTs in each 
condition are displayed in Table 1. 
As predicted, the ANOVA showed an Emotion x Target Race interaction, F(5, 185) = 
2.61, p < .026, suggesting that contextual information (i.e., flanker words) affected the 
correct categorization of target faces by race. This overall ANOVA was followed by planned 
contrasts examining conditions of interest, that is, contrasting fear with happiness (see 
Hypothesis 3). This contrast also produced a significant Emotion x Target Race interaction, 
F(1, 27) = 6.76, p < .013 (see Figure 1). However, inspection of the means associated with 
this contrast indicated an unpredicted pattern. Specifically, RTs were significantly longer 
when White targets were flanked by happiness-related words (M = 450.01) compared to fear-
related words (M = 441.90). RTs to categorize Black targets did not differ in the happiness 
(M = 441.70) and fear (M = 442.67) word conditions. Both the main effects of Emotion (F[5, 
185] = .89, p = .49) and Race (F[1, 37] = .74, p = .39) were nonsignificant. 
Accuracy was also examined by calculating the percentage of hits for each condition 
and was subjected to a 6 (Emotion: anxiety, anger, fear, happiness, sadness, disgust) x 2 
 (Target Race: Black or White). There was no significant main effect of Emotion, F(5, 185) = 
.47, p = .79 but there was a marginally significant effect for Target Race, F(1, 37) = 2.68, p = 
.11, such that participants were slightly more accurate when categorizing White targets (M = 
84.82%) than Black targets (M = 83.03%). The interaction between Emotion and Target Race 
was not significant, F(5, 185) = .73, p = .60. 
Flanker Task: ERP Data 
 Due to a large number of EEG artifacts, ERP data from one participant were 
discarded. Thus, analyses of ERP data were based on 36 participants. As in previous research 
(see Ito & Urland, 2005), analyses of all ERP component amplitudes were conducted at the 
electrode at which the component was maximal, using a series of 6 (Emotion: anxiety, anger, 
fear, happiness, sadness, disgust) x 2 (Target race: Black or White) repeated measures 
ANOVAs. Analyses including data from 15 major electrode sites (i.e., using a 6 [Emotion] x 
2 [Target Race] x 15 [Electrode] design) resulted in the same general pattern of effects 
reported here. Quantification of ERP components of interest was based on visual inspection 
of single-participant averaged waveforms across the scalp. The N100 component was largest 
at the frontal midline site (Fz) and so was quantified as the average voltage value between 25 
and 135 ms post-stimulus at Fz. The P200 was largest at the midline parietal (Pz) electrode 
and was quantified as the average voltage between 135 and 230 ms at that site. The N200 
component was largest at Fz and was quantified as the average voltage between 230 and 315 
ms post-stimulus at that site. The P300 was largest at Pz and was quantified as the average 
voltage between 315 and 515 ms at that site. Finally, P300 latency was quantified as the 
largest positive peak at the Pz electrode between 300 and 800 ms post-stimulus.  
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  Early effects: N100, P200, N200. Analyses of N100 amplitude showed no significant 
effects. The Emotion main effect indicated similar N100 amplitudes for all emotions, F(5, 
180) = 1.14, p = .34 and there also was no significant Target Race effect, F(1, 36) = .52, p = 
.48. The interaction involving Target Race and Emotion also was nonsignificant, F(5, 180) = 
.14, p = .98. 
P200 amplitude analyses revealed a significant Target Race main effect, F(1, 36) = 
67.17, p < .001. As shown in Figure 2, P200 amplitudes were larger for Black targets (M = 
4.78 µV) than for White targets (M = 3.44 µV), consistent with numerous previous reports 
(Dickter & Bartholow, 2006; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Ito et al., 2004). The main effect for 
Emotion did not reach significance, F(5, 180) = 1.53, p = .18, nor did the interaction between 
Target Race and Emotion, F(5, 180) = .66, p = .66.  
Several planned comparisons were performed in order to examine the role that the 
P200 plays in processing threat (see Hypothesis 4). In support of this idea, targets surrounded 
by anger words (M = 4.41 µV) produced larger P200 than targets surrounded by happy words 
(M = 3.73 µV), F(1, 36) = 5.39, p < .03. Also, although not significant, the means for anxiety 
(M = 4.24 µV) and fear (M = 4.09 µV) were also larger compared to happiness, F(1, 36) = 
2.89, p = .10 and F(1, 36) = 1.63, p = .21, respectively. Finally, when all negative emotion 
words were combined, the mean for this composite (M = 4.21 µV) was marginally larger than 
the mean for happiness, F(1, 36) = 3.86, p = .06. 
Analysis of the N200 also showed a significant main effect for Target Race, F(1, 36) 
= 63.26, p < .001 (see Figure 2). However, in contrast to the P200, the N200 was larger for 
White targets (M = -3.33 µV) compared to Black targets (M = -1.70 µV), again consistent 
with previous reports (Dickter & Bartholow, 2006; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005; Ito et al., 
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 2004). The main effect of Emotion was not significant, F(5, 180) = .72, p = .61, nor was the 
interaction between Emotion and Target Race, F(5, 180) = 1.00, p = .42. 
 Later evaluative processes. The ANOVA on P300 amplitude showed a significant 
main effect of Target Race, F(1, 36) = 33.36, p < .001, such that the P300 was larger for 
Black targets (M = 9.61 µV) than White targets (M = 7.91 µV). The overall Emotion x Target 
Race interaction was not significant, F(5, 180) = 1.11, p = .36. However, when only fear and 
happiness trials were included, a contrast of primary interest to the present research 
(Hypothesis 3), the main effect of Target Race was qualified by a marginally significant 
Emotion x Target Race interaction, F(1, 36) = 3.36, p < .075, revealing a larger difference 
between Black and White targets for fear trials (M difference = 1.88, t(36) = 4.69, p < .01) 
than for happiness trials (M difference = .84, t(36) = 1.39, p = .17; see Figure 3). There was 
no Emotion main effect for the P300 amplitude, F(5, 180) = 1.12, p = .35. 
 The full ANOVA of P300 latencies showed no significant effects. That is, the Race 
main effect yielded no differences between Black and White targets, F(1, 36) = 1.76, p = .19 
and the Emotion main effect also failed to reach significance, F(5, 180) = 1.58, p = .17. 
Finally, the interaction between Target Race and Emotion also was nonsignificant, F(5, 180) 
= .64, p = .67. However, when specific race contrasts were computed in each flanker word 
condition, a significant main effect emerged for the fear word condition, F(1, 36) = 4.59, p < 
.04. Inspection of the means showed that P300 latency was shorter when Black targets were 
flanked by fear words (M = 405.05) than when White targets were flanked by fear words (M 
= 417.11). Specific race contrasts in the other emotion word conditions showed no significant 
differences as a function of target race (Fs < 1.35, ps > .40). 
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 Weapons Task: RT Data 
  Analyses of RTs for the weapon task were conducted according to Payne (2001). 
Therefore, RT trials that exceeded 1000 ms and that were less than 100 ms were eliminated 
from data analysis, as were incorrect responses. Additionally, 1 participant had so many 
errors that the data were dropped from analyses, leaving 36 participants. Mean RTs were 
computed for each trial type: Black prime-gun, Black prime-tool, White prime-gun, and 
White prime-tool. Data were then analyzed using a 2 (Prime: Black or White) x 2 (Target: 
gun or tool) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).  
Consistent with Payne’s (2001) results, a significant Prime x Target interaction was 
found, F(1, 35) = 6.19, p < .02 (see Figure 4). Examination of the means suggested that 
participants identified guns faster following a Black face (M = 362.20) than a White face (M 
= 365.33), although the simple effect test of these means did not reach significance, F(1, 35) 
= 1.27, p = .27. Additionally, participants were quicker to identify tools following a White 
face (M = 356.52) than following a Black face (M = 366.85), F(1, 35) = 5.25, p < .03 (see 
Table 2). Both main effects were nonsignificant – for Prime, F(1, 35) = 1.94, p = .17, and for 
Target, F(1, 35) = .26, p = .61. 
Weapons Task: Accuracy Data 
 Accuracy rates for each condition were calculated and were relatively low (66%). The 
accuracy data were analyzed using a 2 (Prime: Black or White) x 2 (Target: gun or tool) 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Results indicated no main effect for 
Prime, F(1, 35) = 2.00, p = .17. However, consistent with Payne (2001), there was a main 
effect of Target, F(1, 35) = 18.01, p < .001, indicating that participants had lower accuracy 
towards responding to tool trials (M = 51%) than they did to gun trials (M = 66%). This main 
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 effect was qualified by a significant Prime x Target interaction, F(1, 35) = 14.77, p < .001. 
Simple effects tests revealed that participants were more accurate at categorizing guns after 
seeing a Black prime (M = 69%) than a White prime (M = .63%), F(1, 35) = 7.54, p < .01. 
Additionally, participants were more likely to mistakenly identify a tool as a gun when 
primed with a Black face than a White face, F(1, 35) = 14.19, p < .001. That is, the accuracy 
rate for the Black-tool condition (M = 46%) was significantly lower than the White tool 
condition (56%). These accuracy results are consistent with the findings from Payne (2001). 
Weapons Task: Automatic and Controlled Components 
 In addition to analyzing RT on correct trials, it is also possible to extract estimates of 
the influence of automatic and controlled processes on responses in this task. This is done 
with the process dissociation procedure (PDP), first used by Jacoby (1991). The PDP allows 
one to estimate the unique contributions on task performance from the automatic bias and 
controlled perception that may contribute to differences in RTs and error rates. As in Payne’s 
(2001) analyses, each estimate was calculated differently for Black and White prime trials 
based on the congruency of each condition, which was determined by the stereotypic match 
between race of prime and target. A trial in which a tool is preceded by a Black prime was 
considered an incongruent condition. A congruent condition was considered a trial in which a 
gun was preceded by a Black prime. Thus, the controlled estimate for Black primes (CB) was 
computed by subtracting the proportion of incorrect tool trials from correct gun trials. The 
automatic estimate for Black primes (AB) was reached by subtracting (1/CB) from the 
incorrect tool trials. For White primes, the controlled estimate (CW) was calculated by 
subtracting the proportion of incorrect gun trials from the proportion of correct tool trials. 
The automatic estimate for White primes (AW) was computed by subtracting (1/CW).  
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 When subjected to a 2 (Race: Black vs. White) x 2 (Estimate: Automatic vs. 
Controlled) repeated measures ANOVA, a main effect of Estimate emerged, in which 
automatic estimates (M = .78) were larger than controlled estimates (M = .53), F(1,35) = 
124.00, p < .001. There was also a marginally significant Race main effect, which was larger 
for White (M = .55) than Black (M = .35), F(1,35) = 3.68, p = .06. The Race x Estimate 
interaction failed to reach significance, F(1,35) = 2.84, p = .10. Because the data were 
structured by using the automatic and controlled estimates for each race condition, it was 
possible to directly compare automatic and controlled estimates across race. When this was 
computed, planned comparisons revealed that the automatic estimate was slightly smaller for 
the Black prime condition (M = .64), compared with the White prime condition (M = .91), 
F(1, 35) = 3.37, p < .07. Consistent with Payne’s (2001) results, this difference disappeared 
in the control estimate, F(1, 35) = 2.00, p = .17. Thus, it appears that priming affected 
automatic processing, but not controlled processing. 
Weapons Task: ERP Data 
 The N200 component of the ERP was analyzed. Due to an error, only 19 participants’ 
N200 data were available. In this study, the N200 was quantified as the largest negative 
amplitude between 0-300 ms post-stimulus on correct trials. Although the N200 was largest 
at the CP4 and C4 electrodes, analyses isolated at these electrodes failed to produce any 
effects, so analyses were conducted with an array including 15 electrodes (F3, FZ, F4, FC3, 
FCZ, FC4, C3, CZ, C4, CP3, CPZ, CP4, P3, PZ, P4). At this level of analysis, a repeated 
measures ANOVA yielded a main effect for Prime, demonstrating that participants had larger 
N200s on trials with Black primes than with White primes, F(1,18) = 7.80, p < .01. The 
Target main effect was not significant, F(1, 18) = .38, p = .55, nor was the interaction 
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 between Prime and Target, F(1, 18) = .57, p = .46. There was also a main effect of electrode, 
which is often the case with ERP analyses, but is theoretically uninteresting, F(14, 252) = 
2.37, p < .01. There were also significant interactions for Prime x Electrode, F(14, 252) = 
2.51, p < .01 as well as Target x Electrode, F(14, 252) = 4.46, p < .01. Finally, there was no 
significant three-way interaction among all variables, F(14, 252) = .78, p = .69. Again, 
because there were no location-specific hypotheses for these data, the Electrode main effect 
and interactions involving Electrode are uninteresting and will not be discussed. 
Individual Difference Measures 
Prior to the experiment, most of the participants (N = 25) completed questionnaire 
measures of familiarity with Blacks as part of a mass survey administered online early in the 
semester (see Appendix IV). For the analyses related to this experiment, responses to these 
questions were combined into a single score, termed “familiarity” (M = 27.16) and the data 
were re-analyzed with the familiarity term as a predictor variable. Familiarity was not a 
significant predictor of any variable in the flanker task (all ps > .1). 
For the weapons task, a measure of racial bias was calculated for each participant. As 
demonstrated in Payne’s (2001) paper, racial bias was determined by subtracting RTs for 
identifying guns in the Black prime condition from identifying guns in the White prime 
condition. Higher scores on this measure are an index of greater racial bias. The mean for 
racial bias was 5.87 for participants in the first experiment, with scores ranging from -30.27 
to 31.46. When a regression analysis was performed in order to predict racial bias from 




 Correlations between Flanker Task ERPs and Weapons Task Performance 
 Besides examining effects within each task, separate analyses were performed that 
combined data from the two tasks to test for connections between brain activation during 
social categorization and a separate behavioral index of racial bias. Thus, ERP component 
amplitudes measured during the flanker task were correlated with behavioral effects in the 
weapons task, including RT to each condition as well as automatic and controlled effects to 
Black and White faces and finally a behavioral index of racial bias measured by the weapons 
task (see Table 4 for correlation matrix). Significant correlations were found between RT to 
White-tool trials in the weapons task with N200 activation in the flanker task to Black targets 
(r = -.44, p < .05) and White targets (r = -.48, p < .05), suggesting that a larger N200 to Black 
targets in the flanker task is correlated with slower RT to White-tool trials in the weapons 
task. Additionally, there were significant correlations between P300 amplitude on Black 
target trials in the flanker task and RT on trials in the weapons task that involved Blacks 
followed by guns (r = -.42, p < .05) and Blacks followed by tools (r = -.49, p < .05). P300 
amplitude on Black target trials also was negatively correlated with trials on the weapons 
task that had Whites followed by guns (r = -.38, p < .05) and Whites followed by tools (r = -
.45, p < .05). P300 amplitude in the flanker task on White trials was also negatively 
correlated with Black-tool trials (r = -.41, p < .05) and White-tool trials (r = -.41, p < .05). 
Finally, behavioral racial bias as indicated by subtracting RTs on White-weapon conditions 
from Black-weapon conditions was significantly negatively correlated with the estimate for 
White control (r = -.38, p < .05) and RT on the White-weapon condition on the weapons task, 
but was not correlated with any ERP components in the flanker task. 
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 Correlational analyses were also conducted between N200 amplitude and measures of 
behavioral bias and automatic and controlled estimates in the weapons task in order to 
establish possible relationships between ERP components and racial biases indices. However, 
the only significant correlation that emerged was between N200 for Black-tool trials and the 







EXPERIMENT 1 DISCUSSION 
  
Experiment 1 involved a paradigm designed to examine the effects of contextual 
information on the processing of Black and White faces in a flanker paradigm. Participants 
engaged in a social categorization task in which they classified the race of the target person 
as Black or White while contextual information was presented on either side of the target 
picture, designed to elicit emotional associations. In addition, the same participants 
completed the weapons task (Payne, 2001) in which they responded to gun or tool stimuli 
which were preceded by either a Black or a White male face.  
 Analyses examining the interaction between contextual words and target race in the 
flanker task emerged for the most part only in the behavioral data. This interaction suggests 
first that participants were unable to ignore the contextual information at this stage in 
processing and that attending to this information affected their responding at the behavioral 
level (RT). The interaction for RT data was inconclusive in that no specific pattern emerged 
with relation to hypotheses of the current paper, other than that participants were quickest to 
respond to White targets embedded in happiness-related information. There were no 
significant contrasts including Black targets, and there were no differences between 
compatible and incompatible conditions, as had been predicted. These findings may suggest 
that emotions as flanker information may not affect the processing of racial information in 
the same way that stereotype- or race-related distracter information may affect this 
processing. 
 Although context information in the form of flanker words obviously affected 
behavior, although not in a systematic way, it did not seem to affect the physiological 
processes during the task. The lack of differences between compatible and incompatible 
conditions at the neurological level may be due to the nature of the flanker paradigm used in 
the present study. Previous research has demonstrated that when the flanker stimuli are not 
mapped on to an experimentally defined response, differences emerge on response-related 
measures, but may not occur on stimulus-related measures like the ERP components 
measured here (Smid, Lamain, Hogeboom, Mulder, & Mulder, 1991).  
However, important race main effects did emerge in the ERP data. These effects 
indicated that participants gave more attention to Black targets in early stages of processing 
(P200) and more attention to White targets later (N200). These results replicate previous 
findings suggesting that participants attend differently to racial ingroup and outgroup targets 
at different stages of processing (Dickter & Bartholow, 2006; Ito & Urland, 2003, 2005) and 
also support Hypothesis 2 proposed by the current paper. Additionally, these data provide 
some evidence for Hypothesis 3, that Black targets may elicit a threatening or fear-related 
response. Thus, the larger P200 amplitudes found for Black targets may be due to White 
participants attending more first to the outgroup, perhaps because outgroup members (or 
Blacks per se) are more threatening than ingroup members. Additional evidence that White 
participants may have found Black targets more threatening comes from the P300 latency 
data, which indicated that participants processed Black targets surrounded by fear-related 
words more quickly than White targets surrounded by fear-related words. This finding 
suggests that the Black target and fear-related words may be activating congruent or 
compatible concepts. Although this finding did not clearly emerge in the RT data, it may be 
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 the case that the ERP effects are more sensitive and are a more direct measure of this 
activation than are RT measures. That is, P300 latency may be a more pure measure of 
processing speed because it is not confounded by response output processes, as RT is. 
However, P300 latency may also be tapping into the same construct as RT, in that the two 
tend to be correlated. 
This data also provided information about the nature of negative versus positive 
emotion-related words that were presented as flanker information. That is, anger-related 
words yielded significantly larger P200s than happiness-related words, and all negative 
words elicited larger P200s than the happiness condition, although not all effects were 
significant. This illustrates that negative words elicit more threat than positive words. Thus, 
this study provides additional support for Hypothesis 4, that the P200 is an index of 
threatening stimuli. . 
Experiment 1 yielded a partial replication of the weapons effect, first noted by Payne 
(2001). Participants were faster to respond to trials in which weapon targets were preceded 
by Black primes compared to White primes, although this difference did not reach statistical 
significance in this study. Accuracy data also revealed that participants were more likely to 
falsely identify a tool as a gun when the target was primed with a Black face compared with a 
White face, also consistent with Payne’s (2001) findings. Additionally, the results showed a 
difference between automatic estimates for Black versus White trials but not for controlled 
estimates; this also replicates Payne’s (2001) research, suggesting that the racial primes 
influenced responses regardless of whether processing information in this way would help or 
hinder performance on the task. It was also predicted that there would be greater N200 
amplitudes for incongruent trials on the weapons task, because increases in N200 have been 
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 attributed to increases in response conflict, but the only significant finding was a main effect 
for race. These results may have failed to replicate other experiments because of certain 
timing differences between the current weapons paradigm and the original one. First of all, 
participants in the current study were given a time limit. That is, no responses were accepted 
after 500 ms; this speed constraint may have affected processing during EEG recording. 
Additionally, the interstimulus interval was very long in the current research compared to the 
original weapons paradigm, again due to necessities for EEG recording. In this study, the 
interstimulus interval was 1000 ms, and in Payne’s (2001) study, the targets were presented 
immediately following the primes. Taken together, these two timing differences may have 
led to different results than the original paradigm. More research will be needed to further 
explore this possibility. 
One of the purposes of administering two tasks for Experiment 1 was to compare 
behavioral and physiological responses across the flanker task and the weapons task to 
explore whether ERP measures of differential attention to race, assessed during the flanker 
task, would correlate with behavioral manifestations of race bias assessed by the weapons 
task. This hypothesis was based on the notion that early attention to race should have 
implications for behavioral manifestations of race bias. Although there were some significant 
correlations between ERP amplitudes in the flanker task and behavioral responses in the 
weapons task, no interesting effects emerged between tasks. However, within the weapons 
task, a measure of racial bias did correlate negatively with RT to conditions involving a 
White prime and as well as the White controlled estimate. These findings suggest that racial 
bias as indexed by performance on the gun conditions of the weapons task is negatively 
related to RT in conditions in which participants have to use controlled processing. That is, 
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 as racial bias increases, controlled processing decreases when White targets are being 
processed, yielding quicker RTs when Whites are involved, but not when Black targets are 
involved. Another purpose of the current research was to examine potential effects of an 
individual difference measure of familiarity with Blacks on the tasks. In both tasks, 













Thirty-eight White undergraduates from the University of Missouri-Columbia 
completed this experiment for course credit in an introductory psychology class. As in the 
first experiment, all participants signed up for the experiment online and were healthy, right-
handed adults.  
Materials and Experimental Paradigm 
Stimuli and Paradigm: Flanker Task. This study employed a modified flanker task 
identical to that of Experiment 1 with the exception of the flanker words used. For this 
experiment, the flanker words were stereotypes that represented 5 categories: fear, Black 
negative, Black positive, White positive, and White negative. All words were selected from a 
pilot study in which participants rated a series of words on their valence as well as their 
stereotypicality for Whites and Blacks. The stereotypes that were chosen were words that the 
participants consistently rated most strongly valenced and most typical of a social group. As 
in the first experiment, all words were matched across condition for word length and 
frequency in the English language (see Appendix V for a list of words used). In Experiment 
2, there were 10 possible trial conditions: each stereotype condition was paired with each of 
the two race conditions. 
Stimuli and Paradigm: Weapons Task. The weapons task was identical to that of 
Experiment 1. 
 Procedure  
As in the first study, participants first completed the flanker task and then the 









EXPERIMENT 2 RESULTS 
Flanker Task: RT Data 
 
 Similar to the first experiment analyses, only correct trial RTs ± 3 standard deviations 
from the mean were used in the analyses. However, in the second experiment, these RTs 
were analyzed with a 5 (Stereotype: fear, Black negative, Black positive, White positive, 
White negative) x 2 (Target Race: Black or White) repeated measures ANOVA.  
In the RT analyses, the main effect for Stereotype did not reach significance, F(4, 
152) = 1.08, p = .37, nor did the Target main effect, F(1, 38) = .93, p = .34. However, there 
was a significant interaction of Stereotype x Target Race, F(4, 152) = 2.98, p < .021 (see 
Table 5 for means). Planned comparisons were conducted in each Stereotype condition to 
examine possible differences between means as a function of target race. The only condition 
to produce a significant contrast was that for White positive stereotypes, F(1, 38) = 5.07, p < 
.03, such that trials in which White targets were presented with White positive stereotypes 
were processed more quickly (M = 442.93) than trials in which Black targets were presented 
with White positive stereotypes (M = 451.28).  
Another way to cast these data is in terms of valence rather than stereotypicality. 
Previous studies have shown connections between race and valence (generally Blacks are 
associated with negative valence and Whites are associated with positive valence; e.g., see 
Dovidio et al., 1986). To test for a similar possibility here, the negative traits (Black negative, 
White negative) were collapsed to form a “negative” composite, and the positive traits (Black 
 positive, White positive) were collapsed to form a “positive” composite. The RT data were 
then re-analyzed using a 3 (Stereotype: fear, negative, positive) x 2 (Target Race: Black, 
White) ANOVA design. This analysis yielded a significant interaction, F(2, 76) = 5.78, p < 
.01. The means associated with this interaction are shown in Figure 5. None of the target race 
contrasts within specific word conditions were significant, though participants were 
marginally faster to categorize White targets than Black targets in the positive word 
condition, F(1, 38) = 3.28, p = .078. However, examination of the separate linear contrasts 
for Black target and White target trials across word types revealed a significant increase in 
RT for Black targets, F(1, 38) = 11.04, p < .01, indicating increasingly longer RTs from the 
fear (M = 442.93) to negative (M = 446.14) to positive (M = 448.94) conditions, and a 
marginally significant decrease in RT for White targets across these same conditions (Ms = 
445.51, 444.07, & 442.43, respectively), F(1, 38) = 3.64, p = .063.  
Accuracy means were calculated for each condition across participants and were 
subjected to a 5 (Stereotype: fear, Black negative, Black positive, White positive, White 
negative) x 2 (Target Race: Black or White) repeated measures ANOVA. There was no main 
effect for Stereotype, F(4, 152) = .52, p = .72. However, there was a main effect of Target 
Race, F(1, 38) = 6.24, p < .02, revealing that participants were more accurate categorizing 
White targets (M = 90.62%) than Black targets (M = 89.24%). This pattern replicates the 
accuracy results found in Experiment 1. There was no interaction between Stereotype and 
Target Race, F(4, 152) = 1.18, p = .32. Additionally, when the conditions were collapsed 
according to valence, as was done with the RT means, similar results were found, as there 
was no significant main effect of Stereotype (F[2, 76] = .76, p = .47) but there was a Target 
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 Race main effect, F(1, 38) = 4.49, p < .05. Finally, no interaction was found, F(2, 76) = 1.95, 
p = .15. 
Flanker Task: ERP Data 
 ERP data from one participant were discarded because of EEG artifacts so analyses 
were based on data from 37 participants. As in the first experiment, all ERP analyses were 
conducted at the electrode at which the component was maximal. Each component was 
analyzed using a series of 5 (Stereotype: fear, Black negative, Black positive, White positive, 
White negative) x 2 (Target Race: Black or White) repeated measures ANOVAs. 
Quantification of components differed from Experiment 1 in the following ways. The N100 
component was quantified as the average voltage value between 50 and 150 ms post-stimulus 
at Fz. The P200 was quantified as the average voltage between 150 and 215 ms at Pz. The 
N200 component was largest at Fz and was quantified as the average voltage between 215 
and 300 ms post-stimulus at that site. The P300 was largest at Pz and was quantified as the 
average voltage between 300 and 650 ms at that site. Finally, P300 latency was quantified as 
the largest positive peak at the Pz electrode between 300 and 800 ms post-stimulus.  
 Early effects: N100, P200, N200. Analyses of N100 amplitude showed a marginally 
significant main effect of Stereotype, F(4, 148) = 2.34, p < .058. Planned comparisons 
indicated that targets surrounded by White positive words (M = -3.05) yielded marginally 
larger N100 amplitudes than targets surrounded by White negative words (M = -2.02), F(1, 
37) = 1.37, p = .06, but that no other contrasts approached significance. The main effect for 
Race was not significant, F(1,37) = .07, p = .80, and the interaction also did not reach 
significance, F(4, 148) = 1.36, p = .25.  
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 P200 amplitude analyses revealed a significant Target Race main effect, F(1, 37) = 
21.24, p < .001. Consistent with the results of Experiment 1, data revealed larger amplitudes 
for Black (M = 3.31 µV) targets compared to White (M = 2.35 µV) targets (see Figure 6). 
The Stereotype main effect did not reach significance, F(4, 148) = .29, p = .89, and the 
Stereotype x Target interaction was also nonsignificant, F(4, 148) = .74, p = .56. 
Also consistent with Experiment 1, the analysis of the N200 component showed 
larger amplitudes for White targets (M = -4.79 µV) compared to Black targets (M = -3.64 
µV), F(1, 37) = 28.67, p < .001 (see Figure 6). There was not a significant main effect for 
Stereotype, F(4, 148) = 1.11, p = .35. Unlike Experiment 1, however, this main effect was 
qualified by a Stereotype x Target Race interaction, F(4, 148) = 3.78, p < .006. Although this 
interaction was mainly driven by the Stereotype main effect, planned comparisons revealed 
that there were two stereotype conditions that differed depending on the target race. There 
were larger amplitude N200s on trials in which fear-related words were presented with White 
targets (-5.31 µV) than when they were presented with Black targets (M = -3.15 µV), F(1, 
37) = 16.29, p < .01. Additionally, White targets presented among White positive stereotypes 
elicited larger N200 (M = -5.82 µV) than did Black targets presented among White positive 
stereotypes (M = -3.60 µV), F(1, 37) = 19.50, p < .01. 
 Later evaluative processes. P300 amplitude analyses indicated a significant main 
effect for Stereotype, F(4, 148) = 3.24, p < .014. Examination of the means indicated that 
there were large amplitude P300s on trials in which fear (M = 8.30 µV), White positive (M = 
8.26 µV), and White negative stereotypes (M = 8.09 µV) were presented, compared to trials 
in which Black negative (M = 7.91 µV) and Black positive stereotypes (M = 7.49 µV) were 
shown. Planned comparisons indicated that the only significant differences between 
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 conditions were between the Black positive condition and three other Stereotype conditions: 
fear, F(1, 37) = 13.00, p < .01, White positive, F(1, 37) = 8.95, p < .01, and White negative, 
F(1, 37) = 6.11, p < .02. Additionally, there was a main effect for Target Race, F(1, 37) = 
19.40, p < .001, such that the P300 was larger for Black targets (M = 8.58 µV) than White 
targets (M = 7.44 µV) (see Figure 6). Although a significant interaction did not emerge, F(4, 
148) = .52, p = .72, planned comparisons indicated differences between Black and White 
targets for all stereotypes except for Black positive (all Fs > 6, all ps < .05), suggesting that 
Black targets consistently produced larger amplitude P300s than White targets.  
The full ANOVA of P300 latencies showed a significant effect for Target Race, F(1, 
37) = 10.60, p < .002, indicating longer latencies to White targets (M = 423.63) than Black 
targets (M = 400.11). There was also a marginally significant Stereotype main effect, F(4, 
148) = 2.04, p = .09, in which latencies were longest for targets flanked by Black positive 
words (M = 425.26) compared to fear (M = 410.21), Black negative (M = 413.51), White 
positive (M = 402.70), and White negative words (M = 407.66). Planned comparisons 
revealed that the only significant differences between conditions were between the fear and 
Black positive conditions, F(1, 37) = 4.11, p < .05, and the Black positive and White positive 
conditions, F(1, 37) = 4.62, p < .05. The interaction between Stereotype and Target Race was 
not significant, F(4, 148) = .75, p = .56. Finally, the P300 latency data were collapsed across 
valence of conditions as in the RT data to form three Stereotype conditions: fear, negative, 
and positive. When the data were analyzed with these variables, no new results emerged. As 
reported above, there was a Race main effect, F(1, 37) = 9.32, p < .01, but no main effect for 
Stereotype, F(2, 74) = .24, p = .79 or interaction, F(2, 74) = .46, p = .63. 
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 Weapons Task: RT Data 
 As in Experiment 1, RT analyses on the weapons task included correct trial RTs 
between 100 ms and 1000 ms. Data were analyzed using a 2 (Prime: Black or White) x 2 
(Target: gun or tool) repeated measures ANOVA. Unlike Experiment 1, this analysis 
revealed 2 main effects but no interaction (see Table 6 for means). However, consistent with 
Payne’s (2001) findings, a Target main effect yielded faster responses to gun trials (M = 
338.56) than tool trials (M = 353.76), F(1,38) = 5.80, p < .02. A significant Prime main effect 
showed that participants were faster when primed with a White face (M = 343.57) than a 
Black face (M = 348.76), F(1,38) = 5.80, p < .02. The interaction was not significant, F(1, 
38) = 2.72, p = .15. 
Weapons Task: Accuracy Data 
 Accuracy rates for each condition were calculated and, as in Experiment 1, were 
relatively low (59%). The accuracy data were analyzed using a 2 (Prime: Black or White) x 2 
(Target: gun or tool) repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA). Results indicated a 
main effect for Prime, F(1, 38) = 8.27, p < .01, revealing that participants were more accurate 
at identifying Targets after they had been primed with a White face (M = 61%) than a Black 
face (M = 56%). There was also a main effect of Target, F(1, 38) = 16.76, p < .001, 
indicating that participants has lower accuracy towards responding to tool trials (M = 52%) 
than they did to gun trials (M = 66%). This main effect was qualified by a significant Prime x 
Target interaction, F(1, 38) = 29.41, p < .001. Simple effects tests revealed that participants 
were slightly more accurate at categorizing guns after seeing a Black prime (M = 68%) than a 
White prime (M = 63%), F(1, 38) = 3.14, p = .08. Additionally, participants were more likely 
to mistakenly identify a tool as a gun when primed with a Black face than a White face, F(1, 
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 38) = 35.34, p < .001. That is, the accuracy rate for the Black-tool condition (M = 44%) was 
significantly lower than the White tool condition (52%). These accuracy results are 
consistent with the findings from Payne (2001) as well as the findings from Experiment 1. 
Weapons Task: Automatic and Controlled Components 
 Automatic and controlled estimates for Experiment 2 were calculated using the same 
formulas in Experiment 1 (see Table 7 for means). The estimates were subjected to a 2 
(Race: Black or White) x 2 (Estimate: Automatic vs. Controlled) repeated measures 
ANOVA. This analysis yielded a significant main effect for estimate, F(1,38) = 11.80, p < 
.001 such that automatic estimates (M = .65) were larger than controlled estimates (M = .18), 
regardless of race. There was no significant main effect for race, F(1,38) = .30, p = .59 and 
the interaction between Race and Estimate was also nonsignificant, F(1,38) = .09, p = .77. 
Planned comparisons directly comparing Black vs. White within automatic and controlled 
estimates showed differences between Black (M = .12) and White (M = .23) on the controlled 
estimate, F(1,38) = 8.27, p < .01 but no differences between Black (M = .64) and White (M = 
.67) on the automatic estimate, F(1,38) = .01, p = .91, revealing the opposite pattern of 
Experiment 1. 
Weapons Task: ERP Data 
 The N200 component was analyzed as in Experiment 1, except that in this case the 
N200 was quantified as the largest negative amplitude 0-300 ms post-stimulus at CZ, where 
the component was largest. Due to an error, N200 data was only available for 18 participants 
for the weapons task. The N200 was investigated using a 2 (Prime: Black or White) x 2 
(Target: gun or tool) repeated measures ANOVA. No significant main effects were found for 
Prime, F(1, 17) = .61, p = .44 or Target, F(1, 17) = .01, p = .91. However, the analyses 
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 revealed a significant Prime x Target interaction, F(1, 17) = 8.65, p < .01. Planned 
comparisons showed that guns elicited similar N200 amplitude (M = -.70) than did tools (M 
= -1.76) when following White primes, F(1, 17) = 3.05, p = .10, but following Black primes 
guns (M = -3.00) elicited larger N200s than did tools (M = -1.60), F(1, 17) = 7.40, p < .01. 
Correlations Between Flanker Task and Weapons Task 
 As in Experiment 1, correlations were examined comparing ERPs measured in the 
flanker task with behavioral effects in the weapons task, including RT to each condition as 
well as automatic and controlled effects to Black and White faces. Although there were 
several significant correlations between N200, P200, and P300 components within the 
flanker task, these are to be expected with ERP effects and thus are theoretically 
uninteresting (see Table 8 for full correlation matrix). Significant correlations also emerged 
within the weapons task between automatic and controlled components and Target trial type, 
but again, these are less interesting than potential correlations that may have arisen between 
flanker task ERPs and measures of racial bias in the weapons task. Finally, there were also 
significant correlations between the racial bias measure and RT for Black-tool, White-gun, 
and White-tool conditions (rs = -.37, p < .05), but these are to be expected given the way that 
the racial bias measure was calculated (i.e., by taking RT differences between conditions). 
Therefore, these correlations will not be discussed further. 
 Correlational analyses were also conducted between N200 amplitude and measures of 
behavioral bias and automatic and controlled estimates within the weapons task in order to 
establish possible relationships between ERP components and racial bias indices. 
Interestingly, a significant correlation emerged between behavioral racial bias on the 
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 weapons task and N200 amplitude with both Black-gun (r = .64, p < .05) and Black-tool (r = 
.62, p < .05) conditions. 
Individual Difference Measures 
As in the first experiment, most participants in second experiment (N = 28) completed 
a questionnaire with “familiarity” items relating to their experiences with Blacks (M = 29.71) 
and the data were re-analyzed with the familiarity term as a predictor variable. Familiarity 
was not a significant predictor of any variable in the flanker task. Familiarity was also 
included as a factor in the analysis of race bias in the weapons task and, like Experiment 1, 









EXPERIMENT 2 DISCUSSION 
 
Experiment 2 involved the same basic flanker and weapons paradigms as Experiment 
1, but used stereotypes as flanker words instead of emotion-related words. The use of 
stereotypes in this modified flanker paradigm allowed for the examination of attention to and 
activation of these stereotypes while participants were racially categorizing Black and White 
faces. As in Experiment 1, the results of the second study illustrated that, in the flanker task, 
contextual information (i.e., stereotype-related flanker words) did not affect categorization of 
the target faces until later processing stages. That is, there were no interactions between 
target race and flanker words in early ERP components in the flanker task. However, the RT 
data told a different story. Consistent with Experiment 1, the RT results indicated a 
significant interaction, suggesting that the flanker words affected speed with which 
participants categorized the target faces. 
The RT analyses in the flanker paradigm also revealed interesting patterns between 
stereotype conditions. Participants were slowest to correctly categorize White faces when 
they were surrounded by fear-related words but RT was facilitated when White faces were 
flanked by positive words. Additionally, participants were quickest to correctly categorize 
Black faces when they were embedded in fear-related words but RT was slowed when 
positive distracter information was present. These results suggest that participants were 
attending to the flanker information and that the stereotypes presented are activated during 
each trial and had an effect on categorization speed, based upon stereotype compatibility. 
 That is, responses were facilitated when stereotypes presented were compatible with target 
race (e.g., Black-fear), but responses were slowed when stereotypes were incompatible with 
target race (e.g., Black-positive). This pattern of results also suggests that the activation of 
the fear stereotype may be more closely linked to Blacks than is the activation of negative 
stereotypes, given that RTs to Black targets were faster when paired with fear words than 
with other negative words. Interestingly, the reverse pattern was seen for White targets. This 
pattern of results provides preliminary evidence that the Black-fear pairing may be more 
strongly linked in memory than either the Black-negative pairing or the Black-positive 
pairing, supporting Hypothesis 3. Further support for this hypothesis comes from the N200 
findings reported in Experiment 2. In this analysis, N200 amplitudes were larger for the 
White-fear condition than the Black-fear condition, indicating greater conflict for the 
“incompatible” condition in which White targets were paired with fear-related words. The 
smaller N200 amplitude for the Black-fear pair may indicate relatively less conflict and thus 
a stronger association between the social category of Black and fear. 
Another finding of interest from Experiment 2 was the replication of attention effects 
to Black versus White targets, as indexed by early ERP components (i.e., P200, N200), 
supporting Hypothesis 2. As in the first study, participants showed greater attention first to 
Black targets and then to White targets. As discussed in previous research (Dickter & 
Bartholow, 2006), these effects are theoretically linked to the race of the participant and 
likely represent an ingroup-outgroup attention bias. That is, the particular pattern of effects 
seen here is likely attributable to the fact that White participants were used; the opposite 
pattern of effects would be predicted for Black participants (see Dickter & Bartholow, 2006). 
Additionally, as was cited in Experiment 1, the larger P200 amplitudes to Black targets may 
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 be an indication that Black targets were perceived as more threatening than White targets, as 
the P200 has been described as an index of threat perception. This finding, taken together 
with the behavioral data and the N200 data, provides further evidence that White participants 
may have a stronger association between the category Black and a fear-related stereotype 
than other stereotypes (i.e.., other negative stereotypes). 
Analysis of the weapons task data indicated that participants were quicker to identify 
weapons than tools, a finding consistent with previous research (Payne, 2001). However, 
unlike previous studies, the analysis failed to reveal a significant interaction between prime 
and target, although results indicated that there was a race difference on the controlled 
estimate and not the automatic estimate, which is inconsistent with previous research. Further 
analyses showed that participants allocated the most attention to trials in which a tool was 
presented after a White prime. These findings were not predicted and are inconsistent with 
several other studies that have utilized this exact paradigm; as in the Experiment 1 weapons 
task, these discrepancies may be due to the response deadline imposed on the participants. 
There was also a significant correlation between N200 amplitude for Black-gun and Black-
tool trials in the weapons task with racial bias. This finding is interesting in that it suggests 
that the response conflict indicated by N200 amplitude may be related to a behavioral index 
of racial bias. Finally, as in Experiment 1, the individual difference measure of familiarity 











Two experiments were conducted in order to examine the effects of context 
information, here represented by emotion-related and stereotype-related concepts, on the 
racial categorization process. Another objective of the present research was to explore 
attentional effects that emerge in racial categorization. These experiments also aimed to 
contrast activation of the Black-fear stereotype against other emotions and stereotypes that 
may become activated when perceiving a Black face. Finally, this research examined 
potential links between early psychophysiological activation during racial categorization and 
an implicit behavioral measure of racial bias. A modified flanker task was used in both 
experiments to test the effects of context information on racial categorization, and both also 
utilized an established index of racial bias (i.e., weapons task; Payne, 2001) with the purpose 
of correlating stereotype activation and attention in the flanker task with automatic and 
controlled estimates of bias in the weapons task. 
Taken together, the results from these experiments suggest mixed support for the 
primary hypotheses laid out in the introduction. Hypothesis 1 stated that context information 
was expected to affect the processing of target stimuli in the flanker task at all stages of 
processing. This hypothesis was tested by varying flanker stimuli in both experiments by 
emotion (Experiment 1) and stereotype (Experiment 2). Support for Hypothesis 1 would have 
been indicated by both behavioral and psychophysiological data demonstrating interactions 
between flanker words and target pictures, indicating that participants were attending to both 
 target and distracter information. The results of both experiments instead illustrated that 
contextual information does not affect categorization until later stages of processing. That is, 
in the flanker tasks, only target race main effects were seen in most early ERP components 
(i.e., P200, N200), and these main effects were not qualified by interactions with context 
information (i.e., flanker words). These data suggest that participants did not process the 
flanker information until later in processing. At later processing stages, significant 
interactions emerged in the RT data indicating that participants were attending to the flanker 
words and that these words affected their overt categorization speed. Regardless of whether 
these words were related to emotions or stereotypes, they did not affect racial categorization 
until at least 400 ms after stimulus onset. These results are consistent with previous research 
that has demonstrated that when the flanker stimuli are not mapped on to an experimentally 
defined response, differences emerge on response-related measures, but may not occur on 
stimulus-related ERP components like those measured here (Smid, Lamain, Hogeboom, 
Mulder, & Mulder, 1991). 
This finding provides information about the influence of contextual information on 
the social categorization process above and beyond what is available in the literature. No 
published studies have shown that information presented simultaneously with a target 
influences the categorization of that target only at later stages of processing (but see Dickter 
& Bartholow, 2006). Although previous studies have established that categorization takes 
place very quickly after stimulus presentation (e.g., Ito & Urland, 2003), the present research 
provides insight as to the timeline over which distracter information may play a role in this 
process. Additionally, this finding may be important to the theoretical nature of context 
information in terms of social categorization models. For example, the continuum model 
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 (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) suggests that social perceivers make judgments about individuals 
along a continuum that ranges from category-based beliefs to attribute-based beliefs (i.e., 
individuating information). Similarly, Brewer (1988) proposed a model in which perceivers 
make either category- or person-based judgments about members of social categories. Both 
models suggest that motivation and attention determine whether targets are judged as 
individuals or group members. The findings of the present research suggest that because 
perceivers are first attending to race only and not to context information, they may start out 
by using only category-based information, but then shift to more attribute-based judgments 
later, if certain conditions are met, such as high motivation. Fiske and Neuberg (1990) 
proposed this idea in their model and the results of this paper offer electrocortical support for 
this tenet of the model. This finding may have real-world implications as well. For example, 
when encountering a member of a certain race, our initial categorization of that person into a 
social group may be unaffected by other information at early processing stages, which may 
lead to the activation of race-related stereotypes. External information may then be attended 
to at later processing stages and affect our behavioral reactions to that person once we 
process that information. 
Hypothesis 2 stated that participants would allocate more attention to Black targets 
than to White targets early in processing, and that attention would then shift to White targets. 
Previous studies have found that White participants attend differently to Black and White 
targets, as indicated by early ERP components (e.g., Dickter & Bartholow, 2006; Ito & 
Urland, 2003, 2005; Ito et al., 2004). Consistent with those studies and Hypothesis 2, the 
present research found that White participants’ attention was initially biased toward Black 
targets (seen in P200 target race main effects). Some researchers have suggested that this 
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 difference may be caused by negative stereotypes about Blacks that are activated upon 
perceiving a Black face (e.g., Ito & Urland, 2003). However, other research has demonstrated 
that Black participants show a reversal of this pattern in P200 (Dickter & Bartholow, 2006). 
That is, Black participants show larger P200 to White faces, indicating that perhaps the threat 
may not be the stereotype elicited by Black targets but rather the perception of an outgroup 
member.  
Although the P200 reveals greater early attention to Black targets for White 
participants, attention then shifts to White targets later in processing, as indexed by the N200. 
As is the case with the P200, Dickter and Bartholow (2006) found the opposite pattern of 
results with Black participants, that is, larger N200 amplitudes to Black compared to White 
targets. Taken together, the current results and those of our prior work suggest that the 
pattern of these main effects in early ERP components may be dependent upon the 
participants’ race in addition to the race of the target. Thus, these results indicate that 
attentional effects may not necessarily depend upon negative stereotype activation. 
Consistent with this interpretation, the present studies found that participants gave greater 
attention to the outgroup early in processing, and then shortly after attention was directed 
toward the ingroup. Additionally, these findings suggest that contextual information did not 
affect participants’ attention to race at this stage in processing. The fact that target race main 
effects at this early stage were not qualified by interactions with flanker words suggests that 
the stereotypes and emotions presented peripherally did not affect attention at this stage. 
At later stages of processing, however, contextual information did affect the social 
categorization process and it was at this stage of processing that Hypothesis 3 was tested. 
This hypothesis proposed that the stereotype most linked with Blacks would be a fear-related 
 69
 stereotype and was tested by examining interactions between context words and targets in the 
flanker tasks. Hypothesis 3 was partially supported by the behavioral results in Experiment 1, 
in that emotion words presented as flanker information significantly interacted with target 
race. Thus, these results provide evidence that at this later stage of processing, participants 
were paying attention to the flanker information (even though told to ignore it) and that this 
information was affecting their categorization of target faces, depending on the race of the 
faces and the word presented. Recall that in Experiment 1, the flanker task involved the 
presentation of emotion-related words that fit into the following categories: anxiety, anger, 
fear, happiness, sadness, and disgust. However, the behavioral results were unclear as to 
whether these emotions facilitated or impeded the categorization of Black versus White faces 
because there was no clear pattern of results in the behavioral data. That is, although there 
was a significant interaction between target race and the emotion-related words, there were 
no simple effects differences between White and Black targets for any emotion condition.  
Although the behavioral results in this first experiment did not fully support 
Hypothesis 3, more support comes from the physiological data. That is, the P300 latency data 
indicated that participants were quickest to respond to trials in which Black faces were 
surrounded by fear-related words. Because psychophysiological data is not reliant upon 
physical processes like pressing a response button, P300 latency may be a more pure measure 
of processing speed during social categorization. Thus, these results provide some support 
that the link between Black and fear may be stronger than other emotions. 
The second experiment involved a modified flanker task that utilized the same Black 
and White targets but used flanker words related to the following stereotypes: fear-related, 
White-positive, White-negative, Black-positive, Black-negative. Experiment 2 revealed an 
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 interaction that was perhaps more supportive of Hypothesis 3 than the interaction found in 
Experiment 1. That is, collapsing across stereotype condition revealed that participants were 
the slowest to categorize a White target when surrounded by fear-related information (e.g., 
aggressive, dangerous, threatening, violent) and slowest to categorize a Black target when 
surrounded by positive stereotype-related information (e.g., athletic, funny, ambitious, 
educated). Reaction times were fastest when Black faces were matched with fear-related 
flankers and when White faces were matched with positive-related flankers. Thus, it appears 
that the content of the flankers influenced social categorization in the following way: fear-
related words facilitated processing of Black faces while impeding the processing of White 
faces while positive words facilitated processing of White faces while impeding the 
processing of Black faces.  
Although previous studies have demonstrated that the Black-negative pair often 
yields faster RTs than the White-positive pair, most studies usually include fear-related 
stereotypes in the negative condition rather than separating them into their own category. 
However, as Experiment 2 shows, there were no differences between the categorization of 
Black and White targets when presented with negative stereotypes when these negative 
stereotypes did not include fear-related stereotypes. Differences did emerge in conditions 
with positive stereotypes and fear-related stereotypes, suggesting that the Black stereotype 
may be more linked to something fear-related than simply negative. More support for 
Hypothesis 3 was found in the weapons tasks, in which Black primes facilitated the 
categorization of guns while White primes slowed the categorization of guns, again 
suggesting a connection between the Black category and a fear-related response. Because 
most studies group fear-related stereotypes into the negative condition, it has been impossible 
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 to sort out which, if any, negative stereotype is more linked to the Black category. This 
research shows preliminary evidence that a fear-related stereotype may be more strongly 
paired with the Black category than other negative, non-fear-related stereotypes. Thus, the 
findings presented here may have implications for studies that examine negative versus 
positive stereotypes of Blacks, and may also suggest that the fear-related stereotypes may 
have been driving the robust finding that Black is equated with “negative”. More research 
should examine potential differences among Black stereotypes within the broader category of 
negative, as well as for other racial groups. 
The explanation that the Blacks may be more strongly linked to a fear-related 
stereotype compared to general negative stereotypes is consistent with the hypotheses of this 
research, which stemmed from a literature that has demonstrated a behavioral and a 
psychophysiological connection between Black and fear. That is, behavioral thought-listing 
tasks have demonstrated that participants are aware that fear-related stereotypes such as 
violent, criminal, and dangerous exist (Devine, 1989; Dovidio et al., 1997; Lepore & Brown, 
1997) and studies have found that traits such as hostility, aggression, and criminality are the 
most prevalent stereotypes about Blacks (Devine & Elliot, 1995; Payne, 2001). Additionally, 
reaction time experiments have demonstrated that participants are quicker to “shoot” Black 
targets than White targets (Correll et al., 2002) and have greater amygdala activated to 
unfamiliar Black versus unfamiliar White faces (Phelps et al., 2000), which has been linked 
to fear responses. Theoretically, the pairing of Black targets with a fear-related stereotype 
may have to do with the link between darkness and threat (Schaller et al., 2003), which 
suggests that a fear reaction to the social group of Blacks may be adaptive (Hurwitz & 
Peffley, 1997). The results of the second experiment presented in this paper support this 
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 theory and demonstrate that identifying the activation of stereotypes upon perception of a 
Black target as “negative” may not be as accurate as defining them as “fear-related.” 
Hypothesis 4 stated that, due to preliminary evidence in previous studies suggesting 
the P200 may be an index of threatening stimuli (Schaller et al., 2003), the P200 in the 
current studies would be larger for trials that involved threatening stimuli, especially Blacks 
and fear-related words. Results from both experiments indicated that Black targets yielded 
larger P200s than did White targets. This may suggest a link between the category of Black 
and a fear response. Recall, however, that a previous study (Dickter & Bartholow, 2006) 
found that Black participants showed a reversal in P200 amplitude, such that White targets 
yielded larger P200s than Black targets. Thus, it may be that the “threat” indexed by the P200 
is a fear of the outgroup and may not necessarily be related to a specific stereotype linked 
with Blacks. That is, both Black and White participants are aware of the fear-related 
stereotypes that exist about Blacks and arguably are both activating these stereotypes upon 
seeing a Black target (Devine, 1989). In fact, several studies have shown evidence that Black 
participants automatically activate negative stereotypes about their ingroup in measures of 
implicit bias (e.g., Correll et al., 2002). These findings, coupled with the data from Dickter 
and Bartholow (2006) indicating that Black participants have larger P200 to outgroup targets, 
thus indicates that the P200 is larger to groups that differ from the perceiver and are most 
likely not due to the specific stereotypes about social groups. 
Additional support for Hypothesis 4 came from the physiological data in Experiment 
1. In this case, targets surrounded by negative words produced larger amplitude P200s than 
positive words. There was also larger P200 amplitudes associated with trials that contained 
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 anger-related words relative to trials with happiness-related words. Again, this provides 
support for the hypothesis that the P200 is an index of threatening stimuli. 
Hypothesis 5 posited that there would be a link between the flanker task and the 
weapons task. This hypothesis was tested by examining possible connections between 
physiological responses and measures of racial bias, as indicated by the behavioral results in 
the weapons task. As previously stated, it was expected that participants would direct early 
implicit attention to Black targets, as indexed by early ERP components (specifically, the 
P200). If this early attention to Blacks was due to a fear-related stereotype being accessed 
about the social group “Black,” it would be expected that attention to Black faces may 
predict behavior on a racial bias task. That is, to the extent that a participant gives more 
attention to a Black target and thus has a stronger activation of negative Black stereotypes, 
this participant would score high on a racial bias task (in this case, the weapons task). The 
alternative, however, is that White participants are attending more to Black targets because of 
their outgroup status, leading to no correlations between attentional ERP components and 
racial bias. Since no clear relationship emerged between the attentional ERP components and 
any of the indices of racial bias in either of the experiments, the alternative explanation 
seems more plausible. Thus, it does not seem that early attention to Blacks should be used as 
an index of racial bias – that is, ERPs may not have a functional significance for racial bias 
due to the lack of correspondence between the ERP components and a behavioral measure of 
bias. Taken together with the findings from the P200, it seems that participants are allocating 
greater attention to Black targets based upon the fact that these targets are outgroup 
members, and at this early stage in processing, stereotypes are not influencing attention.  
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 Finally, a measure of familiarity with Blacks was administered to participants to 
assess potential effects of the individual differences on the behavioral or physiological 
measures, but familiarity was not a significant moderator on any analyses. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
Although the data from Experiments 1 and 2 partially supported several of the 
proposed hypotheses, there were also some unexpected findings and some contradictory 
findings across experiments. Therefore, it is important to realize the limitations of this 
research. First, Experiment 1 failed to reveal any differences between conditions in which 
Black targets were involved. It was predicted that RTs would be shorter in trials in which a 
fear-related emotional word was presented as distracter information for Black targets versus 
White targets. Therefore, it is difficult to make conclusions about Hypothesis 3 based upon 
the results from Experiment 1. However, the P300 latency results in Experiment 1 did 
support the predicted pattern and showed potential support for Hypothesis 3, indicating that 
perhaps the behavioral data were not as sensitive as the ERP data in showing context effects. 
Another possibility may be that emotion-related words such as those used in Experiment 1 do 
not affect the categorization process in the same way that stereotypes like those in 
Experiment 2 did. That is, RT results from Experiment 2 were in the predicted direction and 
supported Hypothesis 3 and it may be the case that emotion-related words are processed 
differently or attended to in a different manner than the stereotype-related words. More 
research should be conducted to explore these possibilities. 
Secondly, although there was a significant Prime x Target interaction in the RT data 
for the weapons task in the first experiment, replicating other studies (Payne, 2001; Amodio 
et al., 2004), this effect did not emerge in the second study. Additionally, it was predicted 
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 that there would be correlations across the flanker tasks and the weapons tasks, but there 
were only some significant correlations in the first study and interpreting these findings was 
difficult. However, the accuracy data for the weapons tasks in both experiment did replicate 
previous findings. As previously mentioned, there were differences between the current 
weapons task used and the original task that had to do with timing of stimuli presentation. 
Although these changes in the paradigm were necessary in order to collect physiological 
data, they may have been responsible for the some of the seemingly contradictory results 
found. The lack of consistency across Experiments 1 and 2 regarding the weapons task may 
have led to the fact that Hypothesis 5 was not supported. That is, because the behavioral 
effects found in the current studies were different from those previously found, the lack of 
support for Hypothesis 5 may be unique to this paradigm and not all behavioral data. Thus, it 
is necessary in future research to further explore possible links between early ERP 
components and behavioral racial bias. 
Another limitation was the lack of predicted ERP effects in the weapons tasks. It was 
predicted that participants would show larger N200s to incompatible trials as this component 
has been linked with response conflict. Specifically, the N200 was predicted to be larger on 
trials in which guns were preceded by White faces and tools by Black faces. However, this 
predicted pattern was not seen; indeed, the opposite pattern of effects emerged in Experiment 
2. Taken together, it is difficult to make any strong conclusions about either of the weapons 
tasks because of the lack of compatibility across experiments (in which participants were 
performing the exact same task) as well as the lack of supported predictions. Since there has 
been a limited amount of research on the ERP components activated during the weapons 
task, more research should examine the neural processes that occur during this task. 
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 Additionally, although the current research sought to examine the social 
categorization process in White participants, the lack of Black participants in this experiment 
is another weakness of this line of research. Previous research (Dickter & Bartholow, 2006) 
has demonstrated that Black participants show evidence of different neural processing of the 
same stimuli during a categorization task. Although some of the present findings may be 
generalized to participants of other races, it is likely that Black participants would experience 
the tasks differently and therefore it is not possible to generalize the present findings to other 
racial groups. Future research will help examine potential differences between perceivers 
based on race. 
Conclusions 
 This research provides some preliminary evidence that White participants are quicker 
to associate Black targets with fear-related stimuli, which suggests that the Black-fear pairing 
might be more strongly linked in memory than connections between Black and other 
stereotypes or emotions, both negative and positive. Although previous studies have 
established a link between the Black category and negative stereotypes or emotions, the 
research presented here suggests that there may be more specific associations within the 
negative category. That is, a fear-related response or fear-related stereotypes may be more 
strongly associated with Blacks than other negative responses or stereotypes.  
Additionally, the physiological data presented here support previous research 
indicating that White participants direct greater attention first to Black targets, and then shift 
their attention to White targets. Although some researchers have suggested that greater 
attention to Blacks may be due to the automatic activation of negative traits, this study 
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 coupled with previous studies support the idea that these attentional differences may have to 
do more with ingroup-outgroup distinctions than the specific stereotypes activated. 
Finally, the behavioral data indicate support for dual-processing models of stereotype 
activation in that participants first attended to categorical information, but context 
information only affected responding at later stages of processing. Although previous studies 
have suggested that categorization takes place very quickly after stimulus presentation, this is 
the first study to indicate the specific timeline over which distracter or context information 
plays a role in information processing. Therefore, the findings presented in this document 
provide a unique contribution to the social psychological literature in that this is the first 
series of studies to present both behavioral and electrocortical support for the dual-processing 
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 Table 1: 
 





          Black             White 
 
Flanker Word           M      M 
   
Anxiety 442.94 444.55 
   
Anger 437.63 444.80 
   
Fear 442.67 441.82 
   
Happiness 441.70 450.01 
   
Sadness 444.29 449.99 
   
Disgust 441.55 444.91 




 Table 2: 
 





          Black             White 
 
Target Word           M      M 
   
Gun 362.20 365.33 
   
Tool 366.85 356.52 
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 Table 3: 
 





          Black             White 
 
Estimate           M      M 
   
Automatic .64 .91 
   
Controlled .15 .19 
 
 88
 Table 4: 
 
Correlations between Flanker Task ERPs and Weapons Task Performance: Experiment 1 





N2_black 1.00   
N2_white *0.94 1.00  
P2_black 0.15 0.11 1.00  
P2_white 0.18 0.21 *0.96 1.00  
P3_black *0.40 *0.34 *0.54 *0.54 1.00  
P3_white *0.47 *0.47 *0.49 *0.54 *0.93 1.00 
Black cont -0.09 -0.08 0.20 0.24 0.04 0.12 1.00
Black auto -0.14 -0.15 0.13 0.12 0.00 -0.04 0.09 1.00
White cont -0.16 -0.15 0.27 0.30 0.13 0.19 *0.78 0.17
White auto -0.21 -0.18 0.16 0.23 0.08 0.13 *0.56 0.10
Black gun -0.30 -0.29 -0.07 -0.06 *-0.42 -0.33 0.30 0.10
Black tool -0.33 -0.33 -0.08 -0.09 *-0.49 *-0.41 0.32 0.20
White gun  -0.28 -0.29 -0.11 -0.11 *-0.38 -0.29 *0.37 0.18
White tool *-0.44 *-0.48 -0.07 -0.13 *-0.45 *-0.41 0.28 0.16
 
 
 White control White automatic Black gun Black tool White gun White tool
White cont 1.00  
White auto *0.83 1.00  
Black gun *0.34 0.22 1.00  
Black tool *0.38 0.24 *0.89 1.00 
White gun  *0.45 0.30 *0.94 *0.92 1.00
White tool *0.37 0.21 *0.80 *0.89 *0.83 1.00
 
Note. * = p < .05 
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 Table 5: 
 





          Black             White 
 
Flanker Word           M      M 
   
Fear 442.93 445.51 
   
Negative 446.14 444.07 
   
Positive 448.94 442.43 
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 Table 6: 
 





          Black             White 
 
Target Word           M      M 
   
Gun 339.45 337.69 
   
Tool 358.07 349.45 
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 Table 7: 
 





          Black             White 
 
Estimate           M      M 
   
Automatic .64 .67 
   
Controlled .12 .23 
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 Table 8: 
 
Experiment 2 Correlations between Flanker Task ERPs and Weapons Task Performance 
 N2_black N2_white P2_black P2_white P3_black P3_white Black control
Black 
auto
N2_black 1.00  
N2_white *0.95 1.00  
P2_black 0.26 0.24 1.00  
P2_white 0.26 0.29 *0.95 1.00  
P3_black 0.16 0.14 *0.46 *0.43 1.00  
P3_white 0.11 0.16 *0.39 *0.44 *0.94 1.00 
Black 
control 0.03 0.01 0.22 0.26 0.24 0.22 1.00
Black auto -0.18 -0.22 0.04 0.02 -0.04 0.03 0.23 1.00
White 
control 0.04 0.05 0.22 0.26 0.27 0.27 *0.46 *0.34
White auto -0.01 -0.05 -0.11 -0.09 -0.16 -0.11 0.05 *0.38
Black gun 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.17 -0.09 -0.03 *0.43 0.06
Black tool 0.04 0.00 -0.05 0.02 -0.08 -0.03 *0.43 *0.37
White gun  0.07 0.07 0.03 0.14 -0.10 -0.02 *0.48 0.13
White tool 0.10 0.08 -0.04 0.03 -0.14 -0.07 *0.39 0.30
 
 
 White control White automatic Black gun Black tool White gun 
White 
tool
White cont -0.21  
White auto *0.34 1.00  
Black gun *0.43 0.16 1.00  
Black tool *0.36 0.07 *0.82 1.00 
White gun  *0.36 0.10 *0.97 *0.86 1.00
White tool -0.21 0.12 *0.81 *0.94 *0.85 1.00
 
Note. * = p < .05 
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Experiment 1 Informed Consent 
 





Statement of Informed Consent for the research project entitled: 
Department of Psychological Sciences 
Social Cognitive Neuroscience Lab 
200 South 7th Street 
Columbia, MO 65211 
PHONE (573) 882-1944 
    FAX  (573) 884-5588 
 
University of Missouri-Columbia 
“Recognition of words and faces” 
 
Introduction to the Study: 
• You are being asked to participate in this study in order to attain credit for 
experimental participation in your Introductory Psychology (PSYC 1000) class. 
• Cheryl Dickter of the University of Missouri is conducting this study, under the 
supervision of Dr. Bruce Bartholow. 
 
Purpose: 
• This study is designed to examine the control of attention during recognition of 
faces. 
 
What Will Happen During the Study: 
 
• First, several harmless electrodes will be placed on your scalp and face. These 
electrodes will record the tiny electrical activity in your brain as you view and 
respond to the stimuli presented in this study; the electrodes will not be used to 
harm you in any way. Electrode gel will be inserted into each electrode prior to 
recording, and will need to be washed out of your hair and off of your face 
following the session. This gel easily washes out with water.  Shampoo and a 
private restroom with shower stall are available if you would like to use them. 
• On a computer screen, you will see a series of trials in which a face is presented in 
the center of the screen, with words presented on either side.  The words used are 
associated with emotions. 
• Your task will be to press one of two keys on the response pad depending upon 
whether the person in the middle of your screen is White or Black. 
• Then, you will complete a short computer task in which you will be asked to 
classify pictures of tools and weapons by pressing a button on a response pad. 
• Upon completion, you will receive two hours of experimental credit or 4 credits. 
• There will be approximately 50 participants in this study.  All will be female and 
male undergraduate students at the University of Missouri. 
 
Your Privacy is Important: 
• We will make every effort to protect your privacy. 
• An arbitrary code number has been assigned to you for this study.  The link 
between this code number and information that could be used to personally 
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 identify you will be kept in a locked file cabinet in a locked location in the 
Psychology Building. 
• The results of this experiment will not be linked to any specific individual; we are 
only interested in group averages. 
• No identifying information will ever be made public. 
 
Your Rights: 
• You decide on your own whether or not you want to be in this study. 
• You will not be treated any differently if you decide not to be in this study. 
• If you decide to be in the study, you will receive 4 experimental credits, and you 
will have the right to leave at any time.  If you withdraw from participation once 
the study has begun, you will still receive the amount of experimental credit for 
PSYC 1000 commensurate with the time you spend here. 
• If at any time you have any questions or concerns about being in this study, you 
should contact Dr. Bruce Bartholow (Room 10 McAlester Hall) at (573) 882-
1805, or via email: BartholowB@missouri.edu. 
 
Institutional Review Board Approval: 
• The MU Campus Institutional Review Board (IRB) of the University of Missouri 
has approved this study. 
• If you have any concerns about your rights in this study you may contact the IRB 
office, 483 McReynolds Hall, (573) 882-9585. 
 
Summary: 
• I understand that this is a research study examining attention and recognition of 
faces. 
• If I agree to be in this study, the following things will happen: 
• Several harmless electrodes will be placed on my scalp and face for recording 
of brain and muscle activity. 
• I will view a series of trials in which faces will be presented in the center of 
the screen, with words presented on either side.  My task will be to press one 
of two keys depending upon the race of the target picture.   
• On a later task, I will view a series of trials in which pictures of guns and tools 
will be presented in the center of the screen. My task will be to press one of 
two keys depending on whether the target is a gun or a tool. 
• I will receive four experimental credits for my Introductory Psychology class. 
 
I have had the chance to ask questions about this study if I have any, and they have been 
answered for me.  I understand that I may ask questions at any time during or following the 
study.  I have read the information in this consent form, and I agree to be in the study.   
 
             
  (Signature of participant)      (Date) 
 
         
  (Printed name of participant) 
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 Appendix III: 
 
Experiment 1 Debriefing 
 
 
College of Arts and Science  Department of Psychological Sciences 
Social Cognitive Neuroscience Lab 
200 South 7th Street 
Columbia, MO 65211 
PHONE (573) 882-1944 
    FAX  (573) 884-5588 
 





“Recognition of words and faces” 
 
Thank you for participating in this study today.  In this project, we are interested in examining how 
peripheral information influences one’s ability to accurately and quickly categorize a target stimulus.  In this 
study, you were shown a series of trials in which a face was presented as a target stimulus, flanked on either 
side by words (the “flankers”).  Your task was to indicate as quickly as possible whether the target was Black or 
White.  As you may have noticed, the flanker words we used are commonly associated with emotions in our 
culture.   
In this study, we are interested in how people associate race with emotional words. We will be able to 
identify from your brain waves which emotions people most associate with Blacks and Whites. We predicted 
that you will be more easily able to categorize Black targets when they are surrounded with emotions 
commonly associated with negativity, especially fear-related emotions, and that you would be more easily able 
to categorize White targets when they are surrounded by positive words, such as happiness-related emotions. 
Furthermore, we hypothesized that your brain activity would show evidence of response competition (basically, 
indecision as to which response to make) on trials in which the race of the target is surrounded by words that are 
inconsistent with the stereotypic emotion associated with the racial group. 
For your second task, you completed a paradigm in which you saw a face followed by a gun or a tool. 
Your job was to categorize the item as either a gun or a tool. For this part of the study, we predicted that you 
would be quicker to categorize the guns after seeing a Black target, because Blacks are stereotypically 
associated with violence and Whites are not. Additionally, we predicted that your brain activity would show 
more response competition on trials in which a Black face is followed by a tool. 
Another aspect of this study involves determining whether racial attitudes influence the responses 
participants make.  Earlier this semester, you completed a short online questionnaire on racial attitudes during 
the mass testing session for your Introductory Psychology class.  We hypothesized that individuals with more 
extreme racial attitudes will show more evidence of response competition, compared to individuals whose racial 
attitudes are less extreme. 
 Be assured that the data you provided today will never be linked to you personally and cannot be used 
to identify you.  An arbitrary code number has been assigned to your data, and this code is not linked to your 
name or any other personally identifiable information.  This number merely represents the responses that you 
made during the experiment.  Furthermore, the researcher cannot identify you personally based on your code 
number.  Also, your racial attitude data will not be linked to you personally and will only be used in aggregate 
with the responses of other individuals.   
 Thank you again for participating in this research.  We would like to ask that you please not discuss 
any aspect of this study with any student who might participate in this experiment.  This is to ensure that future 
participants will have the same experience that you had.  It is very important for the integrity of this research 
that participants not be aware of the full scope of this study prior to participating. At this time, please ask the 
researcher if you have any questions concerning this study or your involvement in it.   
 
Should you at any time have questions concerning this study, please feel free to contact Dr. Bruce Bartholow 
(10 McAlester Hall; 882-1805; email: bartholowb@missouri.edu).  Again, we ask that you not discuss any 
aspect of this experiment with anyone.  It is important to the research that each participant have the same 
experience, and that participants all begin without full knowledge of all aspects of the study. 
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 Appendix IV: 
 
Familiarity Questionnaire Items 
 
Instructions: For each of the next three items, please estimate the approximate percentage of 
people who are or were represented by each of the racial groups listed.  For example, on the 
first item, if you went to a high school in which half of the students were White and the other 
half were Black, you would respond 50% for White, 50% for Black/African-American, and 
0% for each of the other 3 categories. 
 
What percentage (approximately) of the students in your high school were represented by 







  What percentage (approximately) of the people in your neighborhood where you grew up 
were represented by each of the following racial groups?  (Note that the percentages should 







What percentage (approximately) of your friends and acquaintances are represented by 










Experiment 2 Flanker Words 
 
Black Fear: 
1. aggressive 
2. dangerous 
3. threatening 
4. violent 
 
Black Negative: 
1. ignorant 
2. stupid 
3. dirty 
4. dishonest 
 
Black Positive: 
1. athletic 
2. funny 
3. entertaining 
4. expressive 
 
White Negative: 
1. weak 
2. greedy 
3. selfish 
4. conceited 
 
White Positive: 
1. ambitious 
2. educated 
3. polite 
4. intelligent 
 
  
